THE PLAIN VIEW

A Quarterly Journal
concerned with human relations and with the quality of living

SPRING 1951

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A Humanist Metaphysics	CORLISS LAMONT
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THE PLAIN VIEW

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Ὦ ὀλίγον οὐχ ἱκανόν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν ἱκανόν. —EPICURUS

The man who is not satisfied with little is satisfied with nothing

UBERTATES ET COPIAE VIRTUTIS —CICERO

the productiveness and the resources of human quality

THIS IS THAT WHICH WILL INDEED DIGNIFY AND EXALT KNOWLEDGE, IF CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION MAY BE MORE NEARLY AND STRAITLY CONJOINED AND UNITED TOGETHER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN: A CONJUNCTION LIKE UNTO THAT OF THE TWO HIGHEST PLANETS, SATURN THE PLANET OF REST AND CONTEMPLATION, AND JUPITER, THE PLANET OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACTION. —BACON

What the plain view perceives is neither obvious nor obscure

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COMMENTARY

SAME AGAIN. We would have more confidence in our present foreign policy if there were something more in it than the following of disastrous historical precedents. No dictum is more vulnerable than the venerable *Si vis pacem, para bellum,* and between the wars none was more vehemently denounced and derided: experience had shown that to arm was provocative, and that an arms race was sooner or later a shooting match. Now the maxim is restored to honour, because we have been reminded of that other saying, *Homo homini lupus;* and it is the lamb who is a provocation to the wolf. If we have to be provocative whatever we do, it seems better to provoke a fight in which we stand some chance of winning than a meal in which we are sure of being eaten. We might have escaped the dilemma if we had put all our policy into a third alternative, viz, into saying with the loudness of actions that our intentions were strong but peaceful. Resistance by collective action to aggression in Korea was right enough, and it was an unequalled opportunity of introducing something new in history, of showing that the era of wars is past, of demonstrating the controlled application of force merely as an instrument to suppress the use of force. Used to halt aggression in order to initiate negotiations for a settlement of the issue, that is, as an instrument of U.N. policy, collective action might have opened a new chapter in international relations. There is no certainty that it would have done so, but at least something would have been done to establish mutual confidence, to disarm suspicion, to introduce the new factor which could make the outcome different from the sorry sequence of all the historical precedents. As it is, we have good reason to suspect the intentions of the Soviet Union, and they have their own reasons for suspecting ours. It is madness to go blindly forward in the assurance of their sinister intentions and our own good faith. It cannot possibly look like that in the Kremlin, even in the coolest hour. In the present situation, words are worthless, and intentions cannot be fully and finally attributed to democratic nations. Nothing short of decisive and impressive actions can possibly argue a will to peace and negotiation in the pass to which things have come. Of course we must negotiate from strength; there is no hope of anything just or stable that is not an outcome of negotiations between equals; but the strength that is too confident, or not confident enough, to make concessions or to be willing to trust is aggressive war-making strength. These psychological and moral truths are as old as man and as old as the dangerous game that is now being played. An unexampled effort to demonstrate our will

for peace and the rule of law and to meet Soviet views and needs and feelings, coupled with equal strength, is the only bid on which we can hope to save peace. It is a complex demand and calls for exceptionally mature and resourceful statesmanship. There was never more at stake.

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. "What policy more self-destructive can any nation follow than to regard as public enemies men who have committed no crime or wickedness save that of freely exercising their intelligence?" Spinoza's rhetorical question requires no answer, and there seems to be nothing more to be said. However, the historical reasons why freedom of thought has been a weak cause more often than not are worth considering, for otherwise the abstract rational statement of the case makes history seem even more sinister and stupid than it really is. There are four main reasons: (1) those who have demanded freedom of thought have been unwilling to ally themselves with those whose first demand was bread; (2) the challenge to authority has usually come from minorities denying the right and threatening the power of the authority to rule; (3) when freedom of thought has been established, the destructiveness of intelligence has been rampant; (4) the masses cannot be expected to put any special value on freedom of thought, and when power passes into their hands it is their priorities which have attention.

(1) During the 19th century, the workers were seeking political rights and willingly supported those elements of the middle classes who fought for civil liberties, but they suffered in vain; their own grievances got no attention, and some of their leaders learned to think simply and solely in terms of power in their own hands. This was especially true in France, where the Third Republic was the sequel to a century of disillusionment for the workers. There is no doubt that communist intransigence and contempt for bourgeois rights owes something to experience and is neither blind will to power nor abstract theory, simply.

(2) The liberal ideal of the State as a neutral authority maintaining political order, and especially the rights of individuals and of minorities, was historically the idealization of failure, the failure of political authority to create religious uniformity. The Elizabethan religious settlement was a specially tolerant attempt to find a stable compromise that would accommodate all, but Elizabeth did not contemplate anything other than uniformity, even if she were willing to wink at a good deal of deviation in practice. Civil war and years of persecution and discrimination, coming right down to the threshold of our own age, was the price paid for acceptance of the

idea of full civil rights for religious minorities guaranteed by a neutral state. One cannot fail to notice that the new ideal is concomitant with a decline in zealous religious faith and a shift of the seat of the faith from the communion to the individual conscience. It is a sequel to the historical failure of an earlier ideal, relinquished with great reluctance. And unless the political union is strong enough to engender social union and the formation of common interests and purposes, the new ideal, the secular liberal ideal, fails like the earlier one. Then the new political creeds attempt to do what the old religious creeds failed to do. How far they can succeed we do not know.

(3) Freedom of thought is negative, and it has always been recognized that what it allows may be noxious. The argument has been that the harm of suppression is greater because it extinguishes the truth which in a free field will in the long run prevail over error. It is hardly profitable to discuss whether or not this pious hope is justified. The disintegration of beliefs which sets in with freedom of thought and the climate of scepticism which tends to prevail make for virtues and vices, and in this case the vices are of a kind which specially tend to dissolve a society. The evaporation of strong loyalties and strong convictions, the habit of looking at everything with intellectual sympathy as a phenomenon to be understood and explained, the bewilderment and discouragement of the many who hear only disagreements even amongst the experts: this is a thin and over-ripe crop, and most of the grain is shed before the harvest.

(4) The initiative of a demagogue or of a small disciplined party with a mind and a will to power can be made welcome to many when opinion is in fragments and government weak, if a crisis occurs which calls for a strong hand. The taste for freedom and responsibility is a rare and cultivated thing, not found amongst masses. Most people want paternalism or the individualism of rank indiscipline, not the difficult possibility which freedom is, if the cost of getting what one wants is brought into the reckoning.

These are only some of the more obvious reasons why freedom of thought, which seems so harmless and so reasonable, has been rare in history, even as an ideal. It is not rarely that men fight and die for their convictions, but it is uncommon to find profound respect for the different convictions of other men and a readiness to make sacrifices in order to protect the conditions which permit them to persist in their errors. This is a mature civilized ideal which only strikes root and grows in the light of reflection upon history and experience. It is an ideal upon which the natural man spits unless it is upheld by a strong established tradition continually reinforced by fresh perception and deliberate artifice. So much

restraint and farsightedness cannot be widespread unless it has been made habitual, a social formula, a form of good form.

It is of course wise to protect freedom of thought not only for the sake of the individual and for the amenity of civilized intercourse but also for hard-headed reasons of social utility as the spring of progress, and it is on this ground that it is justified as social policy. But its social advantages are outweighed if its result is anarchy. A common social programme which evokes enthusiasm and carries the consent of the great majority and is the stimulus and the focus of critical and constructive thinking, is the main present-day condition of maintaining and developing the democratic tradition of freedom of thought. The phase of emancipation in which deep divisions were inevitable and progressive is mainly over, and unless there is pretty firm, intelligent, and willing coherence on the new centre of gravity democratic society is bound to regress to a more simple and primitive form.

THE NATION'S GOVERNESS. (No, not one of the less successful of recent Leaders of the House, but one of the more impartial of morning journals.) She is so high-bred and perfect in the knowledge of everything which really matters that it is quite awkward now she can't always be got hold of just every day of the week. Of course her first care is the daily supervision of the small brood in the House, the Nation's offspring in middle life. Strange to say, their behaviour in the House is nearly always almost all that it should be, and seldom calls for reproach; but outside, during week-ends spent away, they sometimes hurl unseemly epithets at each other in public, which is of course highly regrettable and requires the formula of disapprobation even if everybody understands that the boyish will be boyish. In such circumstances, the question of behaviour is of small concern, what engages her most anxious thoughts is the performance of these hopefuls in their daily tasks; and in this the strictness and impartiality of her rule are so constitutional as to be predicable, and even predictable. Thus when she has laid bare the fault of the elder for all to see and condemn, she turns to unmask an equal and opposite offence in the younger. No doubt a person of determined suspicions could discover without the aid of Jove whether or not the even-handed judgments were dispensed by an even-hearted love, but nobody could say that appearances are not kept up, and everybody familiar with legal maxims knows how important it is that justice shall seem to be done. All the rivalry is between the two boys; the girl, the only other in the House, is not strong enough to compete with them, and although she is sometimes high-spirited, and even a little troublesome, it is a sad

question whether she will live many years longer. Another cloud on the horizon is the existence of an illegitimate one, not at present staying in the House, and an *enfant terrible* at that. It is an open secret that the adulterous union was with a foreigner. The governess is discretion itself, never willingly mentions this unfortunate one, and never fails to extend it the usual courtesies when it comes and demands to tell its story.

The unflickering countenance of the governess as she measures out daily due approbation and disapprobation is afterwards regularly relaxed in a little mental fun, which is sometimes rather learned and sometimes quite witty. It is quite quaintly delightful to think that one who is so strictly upright is able to unbend. Such miracles are enough to make one believe in human nature. It just shows what a remarkable people we really are, although we say so as shouldn't. (This last remark seems somehow to leave something to be desired, but unfortunately this happens to be one of the days on which the governess is not available.) We confess to so much respect for this admirable lady that we have actually copied here her own mode of unbending. Of course it is not such a feat for us because we are rather bent on something to start with.

DIVORCE AFTER SEVEN YEARS' SEPARATION

by Robert S. W. Pollard

"WE were married in 1895, separated six weeks after marriage. In 1907 a Court Order for separation was made, the husband paying 9s. 0d. per week, increased in 1914 to 14s. 0d. per week and reduced to 4s. 0d. per week in 1934 on my attaining the age of 60. This latter amount I still pay.

"I have not seen my wife for over forty years and I have lived with another woman for twenty-five years. My age is now 78."

In another case the writer says that fifty-one years ago, his separation was made in a magistrate's court; he is still in this unbelievable position, and unable to obtain a divorce. He continues: "It is incredible to think that after this length of time a couple could ever come together again."

These are only two out of several thousand cases filed with the Marriage Law Reform Society, of married persons who are unable to obtain a divorce under the present law.

However, on March 9th, 1951, a private member's bill to alter the divorce law is to be discussed in the House of Commons on second reading. This bill provides that after seven or more years'

continuous separation the court may, on the petition of either party to a marriage, grant a decree of divorce. No question of guilt or innocence would arise under this law. All that it would be necessary to prove to get a divorce would be the seven or more years' continuous separation and the fact that it was unlikely that cohabitation would be resumed. The latter would largely follow from the fact of the long separation.

To understand the need for this law, it is necessary first of all to examine what the present law is, and then to enquire why it gives rise to so many cases where a divorce cannot be obtained. Divorce as distinct from nullity of marriage was first known in England shortly after the Restoration, but until 1857 was only obtainable by private act of Parliament. The divorce petitioner had to go through an elaborate and expensive procedure, including two actions in the courts and the hearing of his petition before a parliamentary committee. The grounds on which Parliament would grant divorce were, in the case of a man, his wife's adultery, or, in the case of a woman, her husband's adultery coupled either with desertion or cruelty. When the Divorce Court was set up in 1857 these remained the grounds with one or two minor additions.

In 1923 the feminists persuaded Parliament to make a husband's adultery alone a ground for divorce by a wife, but the next substantial change did not come until 1937 when A. P. Herbert's Act added the grounds of three years' desertion, cruelty, and incurable insanity preceded by five years' detention which has started with certification.

An important point to note about these grounds for divorce is that they are considered to be matrimonial offences, on the analogy of the criminal law. This element of offence is supposed to exist in all these cases except that of insanity where, what the President of the Divorce Division has referred to as an Act of God intervenes and no fault can, as a rule, be attributed one way or another. The principle of divorce only for a matrimonial offence leads to the assumption that one party is wholly guilty and the other one wholly innocent. The further assumption is also made that the innocent party comes into court with feelings of righteous indignation or anger determined to punish the guilty spouse.

From this basic assumption are derived innumerable subsidiary legal principles and consequences. One is the liability of the guilty party to pay the costs of a divorce, and of a male adulterer, to pay damages. Another is the law of collusion which forbids two spouses to agree that divorce is necessary and to provide the court with the evidence upon which a divorce can be granted to one of them. There is the rule that if the party asking for a divorce has been guilty of

adultery, he loses his right to it and it can then only be granted if the court in its discretion thinks that it is in the public interest. Moreover, in such cases, the petitioner has to file a discretion statement, asking for the court to exercise its discretion in his favour, and giving full details of his adultery, stating why, where, when and with whom it was committed.

The High Court can also grant a judicial separation. This is a decree similar to the old ecclesiastical decree of divorce from bed and board, separating the parties, but giving them no right to re-marry. It is granted for the same offences as for divorce. But the High Court is not the only court which separates parties without divorcing them. Magistrates' courts, since 1895, have been making numerous maintenance and separation orders every year. The order becomes a separation order if a clause is inserted that the wife is not bound to cohabit with her husband. This clause was of importance in former days when a husband acquired all his wife's property because it enabled a separated wife to own property as if she were a single woman, but it is rare nowadays that the addition of this clause is of any value to the wife. The number of magistrates' orders granted annually is important as is shown by the following figures:

1920	11,602	1946	25,400
1930	11,296	1947	20,750
1936	9,854	1948	18,431
1939	10,538	1949	16,951

In addition, in 1949, 7,455 orders were made under the Guardianship of Infants Acts where couples were already separated. In 1948 this figure was smaller—6,066. It is likely that from one hundred to two hundred thousand maintenance, separation or guardianship orders are in force.* The total number of orders in force is some indication of the number of separated couples.

A maintenance or separation order by magistrates can be made on the following grounds:—

I. To a wife if her husband:
   (a) has been convicted of an aggravated assault on her;
   (b) was convicted at quarter sessions or assizes for an assault, and sentenced to two months' imprisonment or more, or fined more than £5;
   (c) has deserted her;
   (d) has been guilty of persistent cruelty to her or her children;
   (e) has wilfully neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for her or her infant children;

*At a small metropolitan magistrates' court which only takes matrimonial cases once a week 52 orders were made in 1950 and there are 483 active orders on the books. There are just over 1,000 magistrates' courts.

(f) has knowingly communicated a venereal disease to her;
(g) has compelled her to submit to prostitution;
(h) is a habitual drunkard or drug addict;
(i) has committed adultery.

II. To a husband if his wife (thus suspending his liability to maintain her):
(a) is an habitual drunkard;
(b) is guilty of persistent cruelty to the children;
(c) has committed adultery.

The bars to divorce, such as collusion, are supposed to apply in a magistrate's court.

There are, however, still other classes of people who are separated but not divorced. There is no law prohibiting married couples from agreeing to separate, and thus agreements or deeds of separation, privately drawn up by solicitors, are very common. It is, however, better to secure the maintenance of a wife, where the parties are separated, by deed of covenant, because it does not prevent a divorce for desertion and these deeds are tending to supersede deeds of separation. Deeds of separation or of covenant do not have to be registered, and it is impossible to ascertain their number, but that there are a great many of them will be confirmed by most solicitors.

Finally there is the class of separated persons who have just informally agreed to separate, or who have just drifted apart. Such cases are by no means uncommon. These separations may occur because a divorce has been refused or because no matrimonial offence exists or where, although there is no grave breach of the marriage relationship, the parties just do not get on together.

Not only divorce and separation orders in the High Court but also separation and maintenance orders in the magistrates' courts are based on the theory of matrimonial offence. No other conduct is considered to justify the separation of spouses. Moreover, the divorce court is strangely restricted in the offences it may recognize for this purpose. For failure to maintain a wife or children only a magistrate's order can be obtained. Conduct such as lesbianism, criminality or neglect of household duties, which may effectively break-up a married life of itself gives no rights in the courts. If no conduct, recognized by law as a matrimonial offence can be proved to exist, then the courts can give no relief, however hard the case.

Divorce after seven years' separation is proposed because the legal doctrine of matrimonial offence as the sole justification (apart from insanity) for divorce involves great suffering for many thousands of people. These are married couples, separated in effect by order of the court or privately, but unable to obtain a divorce. It is important that it should be clear why this is so.

The most important factor preventing divorce is that proceedings can only be brought by the so-called innocent party who may not want a divorce. He may not be interested, or will say he cannot be bothered. Such an attitude, particularly with elderly people, is quite common and in cases of long separation where the unwilling party has little or no chance of re-marrying, it is not a surprising attitude. Another common reason for refusing divorce is that of spite or revenge. A husband who has left his wife is, perhaps, rather optimistic if he expects her to agree to divorce him within a month of his departure. It is to be expected that her pride should be hurt and her feelings wounded, and these emotions are likely to endure for at least a number of months. However, in some cases, they last for many years, and it is not uncommon for a spouse separated for twenty or thirty years to recall bitterly injuries alleged to have been inflicted by the other partner. In other cases the feeling of bitterness will subside into indifference.

The remaining ground on which divorce is refused, is that of religious objection. This is often a cloak for hostility but, of course, genuine Roman Catholic and Anglican objectors are not infrequent and it would obviously be unreasonable to expect a Christian, who sincerely believes divorce always to be wrong, to take proceedings for it.

It is the failure of the innocent party to move for a divorce which is the primary cause of permanent separation. The so-called guilty party has no right whatever to get a divorce. All he, or she, can do is to try and persuade the other party to take some action. This persuasion may take the form of an appeal to her or his goodwill or better nature. On the other hand, more often it takes the form of an offer of increased maintenance, or the surrender of the custody of a child, or even a transfer of property. But even these inducements, where they are possible, fail to move many spouses. They may also be collusive which, in itself, would disqualify the parties for divorce.

A subsidiary factor which may prevent divorce is that neither party may have legal grounds for taking proceedings. Where separation has been by agreement, or has been consented to, there is no desertion in law. Desertion is the wilful abandonment without just cause of one partner by the other and against the will of the former. Therefore, where separation is agreed or ordered or authorized by a court there can be no desertion. Separation deeds, judicial separations in the High Court and separation orders in magistartes' courts generally prevent divorce for desertion. Cruelty as a ground is, fortunately, comparatively rare, and for this purpose can be ignored. This leaves adultery as the only possible ground for divorce,

but adultery may not have been committed. Lt.-Col. Marcus Lipton, M.P., in his speech in the House of Commons on the 31st October, 1950, quoted the following pathetic case of a medical man:

"I left my wife in 1924 and tied myself up with a separation agreement making her a good allowance which she could claim under all circumstances, that is, it did not depend on my income. Recently my wife has consented to divorce me. I find to my horror that the only evidence which would be of any use was adultery after being separated for twenty-five years. So now I must be found in bed either with a prostitute or with a woman to whom I am not married. I am a doctor and so the first procedure would ruin my career, quite apart from the deceit and immorality. The woman I want to marry is a professional woman and it would ruin her career. What are we to do?"

Marcus Lipton's comments on this case must, as expressing very common sentiments, also be quoted:

"I ask any hon. Member what answer he would make to a letter of that kind. I personally hold it to be repugnant to any decent normal instinct that large numbers of people should be either virtually sterilized or driven to adultery by the operation of a divorce code which is a mixture of humbug and inhumanity."

We must turn next to the consequence of this inability to obtain a divorce. A separated person may, of course, accept the situation and, if a man, remain lonely without a family and, if a woman, live alone and childless. It is this ascetic state which some would sincerely recommend and which some can practise but there are only a few people who can live such lives without damage, and too often one sees the result in embittered personalities. It is not surprising that many separated parties form an extra-marital union. There is now almost a recognized technique for doing this. One of the parties to the union, generally the woman, will change her name to that of the man, perhaps by unenrolled deed poll for a cost of two or three pounds. There is then no legal bar preventing her adopting the style "Mrs." A case is known where a woman changed her name by deed poll. The parties then went on a week's holiday and on their return told their friends that they had been secretly married. The prestige of the legal institution of marriage is still very high, and it is pathetic to see the desperate attempts of these couples to give the appearance of marriage, and to persuade their friends and relations that they are, in fact, married. Still, in far too many quarters, it is the respectable married woman who shows an irrational "trade union" jealousy of her unmarried sister and condemns her out of hand. The establishment and maintenance of such a union, therefore, tends to lead to continual deceit or lying,

and this, inevitably, must impose a strain, considerable at times, upon both parties. The position becomes more complicated when a child arrives. The child is, in law, permanently illegitimate in these cases, and unless the father attends personally with the woman at the registrar of births, his name should not be entered on the certificate. Sometimes the father's name will be entered as if the parties were married and occasionally, in order to give the child a nominal father, a separated wife has been known to enter her legal husband as the father. By making these false statements, the woman commits a criminal offence and in the latter case the entry may cause the legal husband much difficulty. The parents may then get into psychological difficulties with their child. They often find it difficult to tell it that it is illegitimate, and a child may grow up to be thirty or more before he knows this fact. This atmosphere of concealment is not conducive to domestic peace and harmony.

The unions may also suffer from legal complications or injustices later in life. The woman partner is entitled to no old-age pension under the National Insurance Act, 1946, by virtue of the man's insurance. On the contrary his legal wife may be entitled to it. No widow's pension is payable to the woman if the man dies, even after thirty years or more of cohabitation and the legal wife may get it. And then, perhaps, the man dies without a will leaving some five or six hundred pounds, his life's savings, in the Post Office Savings Bank. Unless his mistress can prove that some of this represents savings out of her earnings or was a gift to her, or that he owed her money, his legal wife will be entitled to the whole of the deceased's property.

It may be noted, however, that after an initial period of strain there is a tendency for the parties to many of these unions to settle down and many of them are life long. This aspect of so many of these unions is an interesting refutation of those opponents of divorce who think that marriage is only maintained by legal force or by religious coercion.

Feelings of women partners to these unions can be illustrated by the following case. A man and woman married in 1928; they were both very young. They found they had made a mistake and the man left in 1930, and his wife obtained a maintenance order against him. In 1931 he met another girl with whom he has lived ever since, and by whom he now has three children, aged seventeen, fifteen and thirteen. The legal wife has recently, under an Act somewhat hastily passed by Parliament in 1949, had her maintenance increased to the sum of five pounds a week, and to pay this money, and feed, clothe and educate her children properly, the man's woman partner has to help him and do a full day's work.

When discussing this case, she said: "Why should I have to work to pay this woman? I am really this man's wife. I have lived with him for twenty years, borne his children and worked for him. What has she done that we should pay her like this?"

In 1949, 3,365 husbands were sent to prison by magistrates for failing to pay their wives maintenance, and for the same cause from 1940 to 1949 inclusive a total of 22,429 husbands went to jail. Not all these husbands could be excused, but it is certain that many of them failed to pay maintenance to their wives, because of a feeling that the orders against them were made unjustly, and because of their grievance against partners who deny divorce. There are naturally no statistics about these extra-marital unions, but it is also significant that when Lt.-Col. Marcus Lipton in 1949 put down an amendment to a bill in the House of Commons to provide for divorce after seven years' separation, he at once received something like four thousand letters. Each communication to the newspapers sent by the Marriage Law Reform Society produces many new cases. If the estimate about the number of magistrates orders is correct there may, with couples privately separated, be two hundred and fifty thousand couples separated but not divorced.

The remedy for this problem is a surprisingly simple one. It is to abandon the principle of divorce only for a matrimonial offence, and to substitute the principle that when a marriage has, in fact, broken down, the law, subject to due safeguards, should recognize this fact and the courts should be empowered to grant a decree of divorce.

That is what the bill proposed by Mrs. Eirene White M.P. would do. Proof of the long period of separation and nothing more is all that would be necessary if it should become law, although the existing grounds would remain. The motives of the partner refusing divorce would be immaterial. The State would be accepting the principles that no stronger proof of the failure of a marriage could be wanted than seven, or more, years' continuous separation, and that in the public interest both parties in that case should be free, in law, to re-marry, found new families, and have the chance of happier lives.

It should perhaps be mentioned that none of the bars to divorce could be applicable to this proposed law. Collusion or a petitioner's own adultery would not prevent a divorce, although the parties' conduct would properly be taken into account by the court when awarding costs or maintenance. It is proposed that the court should have complete discretion about granting maintenance. Where a woman or her child needs maintenance, then her husband will have to pay it, despite the divorce. Moreover, arrears of maintenance,

legally due, will entitle the court to suspend the divorce or adjourn the case until the arrears have been provided for to the satisfaction of the court.*

If the principle of divorce is reorganized it is difficult to think of any really good arguments against this Bill, but it is worth looking at some of those which were used, for instance, in the House of Lords on the 23rd November 1950, when Lord Mancroft moved a motion asking for a Royal Commission on the Marriage and Divorce Law. The Archbishop of York said this would be introducing divorce by consent but we may prefer Lord Hailsham's comment that he did not see parties voluntarily condemning themselves to seven years' solitary misery, in order that, at the end of that period they might marry somebody else. Divorce by consent after all could more quickly be arranged by committing adultery or arranging desertion.

Then, said the Archbishop, the man or woman who believes that divorce is wrong on religious grounds would be wronged by being put in the position of a divorced person. It is true that the proposed law in such cases would override a religious objection to divorce, and rightly so, it is submitted. The interests of society and the vast number of unhappy and separated people demand it. Moreover, the religious objector's conscience would not really be outraged. He, or she, could, and probably would, refuse to recognize the divorce, and it is not proposed that there should be any compulsion to re-marry. Divorce has, in fact, been granted in England since about 1660 and those who object to any divorce on grounds of religious principle must recognize the fact that they are a minority in the nation. They are free to marry or live in celibacy, as they wish. They have no right to inflict their views on the majority. They cannot, in fact, do so, as is shown by the present divorce law, and we cannot acquiesce in their attempt to prevent the proper extension of the law to marriages which are clearly unhappy but cannot at present be dissolved. The spirit of some of these objectors is shown by those who have regretted the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, in so far as it provides for legal assistance paid for by the state to persons who could not otherwise afford to bring a divorce suit.

Then, in the same debate, said the President of the Divorce Division: "This would be introducing an entirely new principle into

*Reform in this branch of the law is also needed but cannot be gone into here. The problem of adequate maintenance for mothers and children in a broken-down marriage can only properly be solved within the framework of an adequate scheme of social security. On this theme the reader can usefully make reference to the Liberal Party Report on the Reform of Income Tax and Social Security Payments (obtainable from 8 Gayfere Street, London, S.W.1, post free 1s. 3d.).

divorce . . . It would be a complete and fundamental departure from the principle upon which divorce has hitherto been granted . . . for over one hundred years matrimonial relief has been granted as a remedy for a proved wrong." We can agree with him very cordially. It would be a new departure and rightly so. The theory of complete innocence on the one hand and complete guilt on the other is legal fiction which is rarely found in fact. Few are the broken marriages where some blame cannot be attached to both sides, but for a court to apportion this blame between the two parties would generally be impossible and always fruitless.

Another argument of the Archbishop was that there were now a large number of divorces and that, when there are easy facilities for divorce, the whole idea of marriage becomes weakened and undermined. To say that the passage into law of the proposed Bill would be to make divorce much easier is nonsense. Seven years' separation out of a person's life is a large slice, and those who want easy divorce will find a quicker way as they do now. The belief that a change in the divorce law produces divorce is muddled thinking, As the Royal Comission on Divorce said in 1912: "Divorce is not a disease but a remedy for a disease. Homes are not broken up by a court but by causes to which we have already referred." (in their report).

The argument that children of a marriage would suffer because of this new divorce law and that it should, therefore, not be passed, cannot be sustained. Children, of course, would suffer, not from the divorce but from the broken marriage. It is not the business of the divorce law to prevent the breakdown of marriages, but to give proper relief when the breakdown has occurred. The prevention of marriage discord rests with parents and educationalists and not with lawyers.

The Bill for divorce after seven years' separation is similar to an Act of Western Australia which became law in 1945, although the period there is only five years. It is interesting to note that contrary to what one might have perhaps expected, more wives than husbands have, in Western Australia, applied for divorce on this ground. The reason for seven years having been selected for this Bill is that in 1947 the Denning Committee (C.M D. 7024) when considering the reform of divorce procedure, made the following remarks:

> "There appears to be a large number of cases where husband and wife have been separated for many years and there is no possibility of their ever coming together again, but a divorce cannot be obtained because the separation was by mutual consent and did not amount in law to desertion. It is suggested for con-

sideration whether separation for 7 years or more should not be a ground for divorce if there is no prospect of reconciliation."

In New Zealand since 1928, an agreement for separation for at least three years, or a separation order made by a court which has been in force for at least three years is a ground for divorce. Some opponents of this Bill argue that the period later will be reduced from seven to five, or even three years. This is not an argument against the Bill. If Parliament, at some later date, finds a need to reduce the period, it will do so. Logically, there is no reason why it might not equally well find a need to lengthen the period.

As recently as March 25th, 1950, the Court of Appeal in the case of Hosegood v. Hosegood, said:

"The Court is not at liberty to grant divorce simply because the marriage has utterly broken down. It might be a good thing if it could do so after long years of separation, even if the separation was originally by agreement or for some cause short of cruelty. But the Statute does not permit it."

The rarity of judicial calls for law reform makes this pronouncement of Lord Justice Denning the more striking. It should, perhaps, also be noted that the Report of the Royal Commission of 1912 made a proposal that the guilty party should have some rights. They recommended that the Court should have power where a judicial separation was asked for to make an order for divorce on the application of the other party. They also thought that a party to a separation agreement, which negatives desertion, should be enabled to apply to the court to treat the deed as at an end. The husband could then be found guilty of desertion from the date on which he defaulted in his payments under the agreement. Magistrates' separation orders, they said, should come to an end after three years and the parties then left to their remedy in the divorce division of the High Court. Here, of course, a petitioner could apply for a judicial separation but, under the Royal Commission's proposals, a respondent, although the "guilty" party could ask for a divorce instead. The germ of the seven years' separation bill can be found in these proposals. Permanent separation, say the supporters of the Bill, is bad for the institution of marriage, bad for society, and the cause of much misery and suffering. They adopt the words of Lord Gorell in the case of Dodd v. Dodd 1906, then President of the Divorce Division, and later Chairman of the Royal Commission on Divorce:

"Applied first in an age remote and in a state of society different from the present, the remedy of permanent separation for matrimonial grievances would always seem to have been unjudicious, even in days when persons could not escape from their surround-

ings as they can now, and when they were more amenable to the pressures and censures of the Church, and is now probably to be regarded as more unsatisfactory still and as tending to demoralization and providing inadequate justice to the innocent."

Marriage for us is an institution made by men. Others may consider that it has a religious origin and sanction. They are free to think what they will, but we deny their right, as we deny the right of the Fascist or the Communist, to control other people because they know, they think, what is best for them.

So long as they try, divorce law will be disregarded and even treated with contempt. This is not good either for the law or for society. There is enough unavoidable misery and suffering in the world without wantonly adding to it. The passage of this Bill into law would help to remove a little unhappiness from England and later from other parts of the world, as English laws naturally spread. It is with the hope that Parliament will help the sufferers from the present law, give them their right to happiness and introduce the sensible principle into the divorce law that divorce will be granted when a marriage has clearly ended, that the supporters of this Bill await March 9th next.

A HUMANIST METAPHYSICS

by Corliss Lamont

PHILOSOPHY originally meant love of wisdom; and it comes back to true wisdom when it is able in some measure to integrate and bridge the various specialized fields of knowledge, which develop so intensively that they are continually breaking up into new specialties. In short, in this age of growing specialization it is more than ever the function of the philosopher to specialize in generalization.

In line with this, critics of Humanism have frequently criticized it for not sufficiently working out a general theory of Nature, that is, a cosmology or metaphysics which describes the fundamental characteristics of the universe. I wish to try my hand at remedying this defect by suggesting what may be called the ultimate traits of existence as such, the irreducible aspects of reality. The categories I have in mind point to the least common denominators of everything that exists and apply with equal relevance to both non-human Nature and human beings. They supplement one another, yet cannot be deduced from each other or from any conception common to some or all of them. There is no explanation of *why* these universal traits exist; they simply *are*.

In this endeavour to outline the first principles of the cosmos I have relied especially upon Aristotle and Spinoza; upon the late Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge, who gave the most stimulating seminar—on metaphysics—that I ever attended; and upon Professor John H. Randall, Jr., who gave the best lecture course—in the history of philosophy—that I ever took. Without pretending that I have drawn up a complete or final prospectus, I submit the following ten basic categories:

1. *Substance* (Matter, Extension). This is an overall term for the many different manifestations of objectively existing matter or stuff which constitute the physical universe and which are continually being converted into one another. This category of Substance denotes "the primary endurance of being," in the words of Professor Roy Wood Sellars.

2. *Activity* (Event, Motion, Energy, Force). Substance is always in movement, flux. It is dynamically active. Just as all activity is the activity of something concrete, so every something, from the lowliest atom to objects such as men and stars, manifests unceasing activity.

3. *Potentiality* (Power). This means the inherent possibilities or powers in every object or form of life of acting upon other things in various ways; and of developing, undergoing change, becoming transformed in various directions.

4. Contingency (Chance). This category is not, as so often claimed, expressive merely of human ignorance of natural processes. It points to something real and objective in the universe, namely, the pervasive and continual meetings or intersections of independent causal sequences both in non-human Nature and in human affairs. The existence of Contingency, in addition to Activity and Potentiality, is sufficient to account for change and the frequent emergence of novelty upon this earth and in the universe at large.

5. *Necessity* (Mechanism, Law, Order). This refers to the cause-effect laws, the if-then sequences in Nature. *If* the temperature drops to 32 degrees Fahrenheit, *then* water freezes. Scientific laws are deterministic only in the sense that the *then* surely follows when the *if* takes place. This conditional necessity leaves room for Contingency, accident and human freedom.

6. *Form* (Pattern, Structure, Organization). All Substance not only is constantly active, but also possesses a certain identifiable form or pattern definable as a stone, a tree, a man or something else. Form never exists apart from Substance and in some Platonic realm beyond Nature.

7. *Individuality*. Every stone, tree, and man is a distinct individual, set off in its discreteness and particularity from all other

things both within and outside of its own genus. Each event and object possesses a certain irreducible character of its own.

As Professor Woodbridge has said, "The definition of reality involves numberless points of departure." The existence of individuality indicates that the cosmos is a vast, complex multiplicity; it is pluralistic and not, as the monistic systems claim, a great overarching unity. The abstract term *universe* designates all of Nature as "one subject of discourse," as William James puts it; but this does not turn its infinite manyness into an all-embracing oneness.

8. *Inter-relation* (Relatedness). Every individual event or entity in the cosmos is related in some manner to some other thing or things. Nothing exists in absolute isolation. When things are related dynamically we have *interaction.* Inter-relation includes the concept of *continuity,* which some thinkers prefer to set up as a separate category.

9. *Synthesis* (Integration). Everything in the universe, from the largest star to the smallest particle, is a combination of various elements; or functions as an integral part of such a combination. A synthesis, compound, or whole is more than the sum of its parts and manifests qualities not found in them.

10. *Eventuation* (Outcome, Culmination, Natural Teleology). This category denotes the continuous process of events in Nature in terms of successive outcomes, culminations, and results (the acorn eventuates in an oak tree, or in nourishment for an animal). In their characteristic means-end procedures, human beings exercising *purpose* utilize actual and possible eventuations for the fulfilment of aims, goals, and ideals. Eventuation does not imply evolution or upward development; outcomes may constitute either retrogression or advance in the light of human values.

This brief summary of Humanist cosmological categories of course omits many which other philosophies have included. Thus Humanism, while recognizing the great significance of concepts like mind, purpose, and goodness in *human* existence, does not consider them basic traits of the universe and refuses to elevate them into controlling forces in the cosmos as a whole. There follow fifteen categories, all familiar in the history of philosophy, which Humanism rejects as applying to the essence of reality:

1. Mind (Reason, Intelligence, Consciousness)
2. Idea
3. Truth
4. Spirit (Soul)
5. Personality
6. Will
7. Purpose (Design, Providence)
8. Love
9. Good (Value, Morality)
10. Evil
11. Beauty
12. Life (Life Force, Elan Vital)
13. First Cause
14. Time
15. Space

Commenting upon two or three of these categories, I wish to point out that Humanism rules out a First Cause as necessary in its philosophy and holds with Aristotle that Nature is infinite in duration, as regards both past and future. This eternity of the cosmos seems to be implied by the Law of the Conservation of Energy. Space and Time, which many thinkers have analyzed as things in themselves, as absolutes through which the world passes, Humanism views as derivative from and relative to Substance and Activity (Matter and Motion).

I offer this outline of a Humanist cosmology or metaphysics in a tentative spirit. In all of its branches the philosophy of Humanism will always remain unfinished. Humanists are ever seeking a closer approximation to the truth; but there can be no finality in this enterprise, either now or as long as humanity endures.

RACIAL SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

by M. L. Burnet

WHAT are the bare facts of geography and race which form the background of the political problems of South Africa? A glance at an atlas reveals that the southern part of Africa is the next thing to Antarctica and though one can be keenly aware of the fact at times when the wind blows from the south on the uplands (nearly all of South Africa is plateaux of varying heights) it does not protrude nearly as far to the south as does the southern end of South America, and in consequence it enjoys a temperate climate. It is the in-between nature of the climate, something like that of the Mediterannean, that has attracted so many races. Up to a few centuries ago, South Africa, like many other parts of the world, North America and Australia, for example, was very sparsely populated according to modern standards, the population consisting of Bushmen who were, and are still, hunters and the Hottentots who were pastoral. The Bushmen of whom a few thousands survive to-day are in many ways the most interesting thing in South Africa.

The first of the incursions into South Africa was that of the Southern Bantus and is calculated to have commenced some four centuries ago, and it is these people who are now described as "natives." The first wave of settlers from Holland came a century later in 1652 and they were followed in 1688 by Huguenots. The Huguenots no doubt made a contribution to the white culture but as a race they have been fused with the Dutch. French names remain; there appear to be as many Rousseau, Marais, and de Plessis

as Van Rensburg, Kruger, or other Dutch names. It should be remarked that the Dutch people have their own language, Afrikaans, and have practically no feeling for their mother country owing to their long settlement in S.A. The first British settlement, apart from individuals, came in 1820. Later, Germans settled and from about 1880 settlers from Eastern Europe, mostly Jews. There are also contributions to the white population from Greece, Turkey, and Portugal.

Those who are not of European, Asiatic or Bantu extraction in a pure form are termed "coloured." They come from unions between Cape Malays or Europeans and the aboriginal Hottentot and of Europeans and Bantus. In the western part of South Africa, around the Cape Peninsular where emigrants from Europe first settled, the native population was Hottentot and Bushman and their numbers were not vast, in consequence of which a much more liberal outlook on racial questions existed.

The fourth major section of the community, the Asiatic, consists mostly of Indians, though there is a small Chinese group. The first Indians were brought as indentured labour to work in the sugar plantations; they were followed by wealthier and more cultured elements who came to the country as traders, and a very few who came as Gandhi did as professional men to look after the interests of the traders.

Out of a total population of 11¼ millions, the four main groups run as follows: Natives 7,735,000, Europeans 2,335,000, Coloured 905,000, Asiatics 282,000. A nice mix-up! What is not always realized by those without first-hand experience is that the native Bantu population is sub-divided into many nations; they fall into five main language groups, the languages of which as the *Handbook on Race Relations* puts it, are not mutually intelligible.

In considering the general make-up of the population, the reflection arises that the improvement of navigation made it a comparatively easy matter for people to pass from one part of the world to another and brought a new factor to bear upon race relations. In modern times it has resulted in the re-population of both North and South America, and of Australia, and is responsible for the mix-up in South Africa. With primitive communities racial inter-action took place between neighbouring peoples and there was not the confrontation of widely differing types as you find in South Africa. In South Africa you get the meeting of the Bantu, who is not a native but an immigrant from warmer climes, with the North European; the two types could hardly be more extreme in stock or in culture.

With these few facts in mind, let us turn to the policy advocated

by the present South African Government led by Dr. Malan of "Apartheid" or separateness. When considering it, we should not only have in mind the particular formulation given to the idea by Dr. Malan and his associates but ask ourselves whether the idea as such is one that could be supported were it conceived and carried out in a just manner. The theory of apartheid is that each of the main racial groups should develop a separate community. The major part of the Bantu population retain a connexion with the land in the shape of a holding in one or other of the various reserves set aside for native occupation. These native reserves would be developed industrially and culturally, and expanded in size so that increasingly the native would not have to go outside to seek work from the European. For various reasons, economic, cultural, and because of differences in the psychic make-up, it is said, people do not get on well together, however regrettable this may be considered. Segregation is a very deep-lying motive, it works briskly within communities in which the population is homogeneous, let alone in mixed racial groups, and it is also to be found where there is no feeling of disparagement for the people against whom the segregation is effected. I am thinking of three groups so akin as the Italians, the French, and the British. Both Italian and French families are to be found who have lived for generations in Britain and yet have kept their language and culture.

When one bears in mind these voluntary segregations of persons of parallel civilizations it is not surprising to find segregation where there is the impact of two vastly differing levels of civilization. The European who does not instinctively withdraw himself when coming into contact with a primitive civilization is something of a freak. The individuals thus placed who merge themselves into a primitive community, apart from those doing it temporarily for the purpose of anthropological study, are probably ill-adapted to the standards of their own civilization and welcome the relaxation that a more simple type of living affords. It is nonsense to say that segregation should not be effected, the real question is to what lengths it should be carried. It is a striking fact that it is a most infrequent occurrence for those white persons who are the most helpful and just in their relations with the natives to inter-marry with them.

There is another problem that it is held that a separationist policy would help, that of the differing standards of living of the different sections of the community and the fears felt by the white that his standards will be undermined by cheaper labour.

As it is very difficult to maintain differential wage rates in the same community for the same job, the present solution, a very bad one, is to reserve certain types of work for the whites and practically

prohibit the members of other racial groups from entry. Separate communities would obviate this difficulty.

A third great advantage of separation would come from the lessening, if not the elimination, of the outnumbering of the white by the other races. Fear of numbers is the cause in very large measure of the present attitude of the white population. Many white people who start off down the road to being liberal in outlook are brought up sharply by the reflection that the democratic path can have but one end, that of putting power into the hands of those who will not have the slightest sympathy with any differentiations in standards of living and may even be colour prejudiced against the white man. It is for this reason that the political Opposition in South Africa have difficulty in successfully opposing the Malan policy. So much for general reasons which lend support to the policy of separation; what of the scheme of the Malan government itself?

Though its advocates declare that it is not a racket and play is made with the fact that it is a policy dictated by Christian values, it has every appearance of being designed to further reduce the meagre rights that the non-white population now have. With the development of the native territories the Bantu is to lose the rights that he now enjoys in the parts of the country outside. This gives an indication of what is really expected of the measures to develop the native territories; if it was expected that the great majority of natives were to be catered for in the Reserves there would be little fear of them economically, or politically. The plans for developing the territories industrially and culturally are nebulous. If anything was to be done worthwhile in connexion with the policy of apartheid it would call for a colossal effort on the part of the white population. The policy statements put out by the Nationalist Party do speak of the sacrifices that are entailed in connexion with their policy, but without being unduly distrustful one questions whether the more conservative half of the South African white population that supports this party really understand that something is expected of them and whether they would have given their support had they done so. Another criticism of the policy as outlined is that it envisages the non-white communities as being permanently inferior to that of the European. A certain degree of self-government within the territories is to be allowed but there is to be no non-white participation in the national parliament. Government within the territories and communities is to be little more than local government, if that. With regard to education, the policy statement says that it must "anchor the Native to his own way of life," clearly indicating that it is not thought that there should be an effort made

to educate the native to modern standards of living. "The financing of education," the statement says, "must be more in keeping with the contribution of the Native to the State income than it is at present. The Native himself must eventually provide for the expenditure and control of Native education under the supervision of Europeans." This indicates that it is foreshadowed that the existing meagre provision for Native education may be reduced. The party is opposed to the organization of Natives into trade unions and advocates a system whereby the State, as guardians, will take care of their interests. "A proper survey of manpower and labour requirements will be made," the statement says, "and an effective division of labour between agriculture, industry, the mines and the cities will be introduced." This appears to indicate that not so many natives are to dwell in the native territories as one might be led to expect. The drift to the towns, meaning the white towns, must be checked and the Native in the urban area must be regarded as a "visitor," the statement says. Well, if the native is to be regarded as a visitor he will not be any worse off than he is now, but one was led to believe that aparthied meant not the checking of the movement of the Native to the towns but his return to his new-found country where he should dwell permanently, though, to be fair, one should say that there is little attempt to conceal the fact that the policy of aparthied is to have only limited application.

I cannot go into detail about the position of the Indians except to say that the apartheid policy makes something hardly less than a declaration of war on them. They are described as "a foreign and outlandish element, which is unassimilable," as if the white population had in fact ever been in favour of assimilating any other race. "They can never become part of the country," the statement says, "and must therefore be treated as an immigrant community." In fact, no one other than the remnant Hottentot and Bushman population has a superior title to be regarded as belonging to the country; 95 per cent. of the S.A. population is of foreign origin. The policy adopted towards them has been described as a ghetto policy. Although it might be held that in future, control of immigration should be exercised so as not to achieve the racial mix-up elsewhere that is to be found in South Africa, the policy pursued in the past, let alone that outlined for the future, is unwarrantable. The Asiatic community, relatively small as it is, is increasing in numbers and increasing far greater in proportion to the other sections of the populations. Repatriation could not be carried out without despoliation, as South Africa has difficulty enough in finding capital for her own development, let alone finding it to buy a section of the population out.

A policy of apartheid that meant anything real to the non-white population would mean great capital investments to produce industry for the non-white communities. These communities are very poor; those with a little land have nothing but the land and a few head of livestock and they have to go to the urban areas, the mines, and to the white-owned farms to earn sufficient to keep them at the low standards they live upon. Even if the white population did want to be magnanimous towards the non-white sections, and that is the last thing one can suspect them of wanting to be, they would be ruined if there was a withdrawal of labour on any considerable scale. The whole industry of the country, including the farming industry, is built upon Native labour.

With apartheid, even with the best will in the world on the part of the whites, the progress of the non-white communities would be very slow. The situation would approximate to that of a Game Reserve, in which conditions are preserved which have long ceased to be characteristic. In South Africa the industrial revolution has never been allowed to take place in anything like its complete form. Owing to the fact that there are four non-whites to each white it has been possible to pursue a policy of low gear exploitation of labour which with the neglect of the non-whites' needs has made it a profitable situation for the dominant white population. Owing to the large numbers of the native population it has been possible to keep the natives tribalized, or most of them. They have to spend most of their time outside the native territory augmenting the small income that they can get off the land. Each native has little land and what he has is overstocked and poorly cultivated. To maintain his holding while he is away in the town or on the white farm he has to leave his wife and children, or one of his wives if he is polygamous. This is obviously a bad arrangement though there are benefits to the Native in being able to escape for a time from the squalor and the regimentation that lowgrade urban living entails; simple living in a primitive state, although not exciting and leaving something to be desired as compared to the best that civilization can offer, is much to be preferred to slum life. But it is not possible to keep the clock back, though this is the present end-policy of South African governments, nor should the position be accepted that life in urban areas must of necessity always be squalid for the Native.

The policy in South Africa should be the completion of the industrial revolution. Plans should be prepared for a vast increase of industrialization. The income of the country could be doubled in fifteen years. A big plan of industrialization is something that could bind the whole country together. It would require all the

available skill, and more, and would do away with the policy of restricting certain occupations to the white section of the community. At the same time, the perspective of great development would mean that skill would have to be respected and the white part of the population having most of it now, and for a long time to come, would safeguard its position and standards. The only moral case for the privileged position of the white is that he is the progressive element. If the white cannot introduce science and technique he is of little use to a backward community. There can be no moral justification for him as a landowner. As far as the economic side goes, there can be no doubt that the present standard of living of the white can be achieved in time for all by an energetic policy of development.

What of the interim period before the economic situation allows of a high standard of living for all? The need for a greatly expanded force of technicians, skilled workers, and administrators would be some safeguard for the conditions of those categories of workers, but what of the unskilled European? The only way appears to be to maintain separate standards and maintain them by law, but with a plan for a levelling up as the economic situation warranted. Political representation would have to be designed so that power broadened gradually but only as industrialization advanced. The final power must rest with the advanced elements, though by this it is not suggested that all manifestations of it should be entirely withheld from any section of any of the communities.

Differential standards must cause a lot of feeling of unfairness on the part of those on the lower scales. "A person gets paid according to the colour of his skin," it would be said. Differential rates do actually exist to-day in certain fields. It would be difficult to convince the non-white communities that there was any validity in the undertaking to close the gap in the standards as production warranted, because in the early phases of a rapid development programme the demands for capital for development would be so great that most of the surplus production would be swallowed up by them. Such a policy is the lesser of two evils, being better than the attempt to maintain differential standards by a segregation of functions between the several communities. A policy of carrying through the industrial revolution would be of particular benefit to the Coloured and the Indian communities as it would find a ready outlet for the skills which they have in more abundance than has the Bantu at present.

If a large scheme of industrialization will do away with occupational segregation what about social segregation, what is to be done about this tremendous problem? Social segregation must be left

largely as a personal matter because you cannot dictate to people with whom they are to associate. One cannot tell a man whom he is to marry, but one should not attempt to tell him, as is the case to-day in South Africa, with whom he should not marry. Public opinion should be directed to seeing that there is more social intercourse between the various races instead of attempting to prohibit the little that now exists. A state in which there will be no discrimination should be the ideal of the future. There will be voluntary discrimination whatever public policy is pursued and distinct communities of Europeans, Bantus, and Indians will be found for a long time to come.

It is comparatively easy to decide what ought to be done, or it may seem so, but how to get the white community to see things in the same light is another matter. What are the factors in this community that affect the issue either way? One favourable factor is that within the bounds of their own community the European South Africans are democratic, much more so in many ways than we are in Britain. In Europe we have a tradition of subservience; there is a hierarchical order of society and we are always looking for some one to bow down to; we seem to think that the knee-joint was provided by Providence so that we can more readily carry out our obeisances. There is none of that attitude within the white community in South Africa.

There is no Big House in the rural community, there is no one within a hundred miles that any white man, however poor, would not be prepared to face on equal terms socially. Neither is he always looking for someone to tell him what to do, there is a natural democracy. Quite spontaneously groups of people faced by a problem resolve themselves into a meeting to discuss ways and means of handling it, and elect representatives to take any further action that may be necessary. They are all orators; they will talk interminably on anything. This gift for talking is probably based upon church attendance which is still strictly observed in the rural communities. In passing, one might say that if there is any sign of subservience it is towards the predikant, the minister of the church. In the Boer War the officering of the Republican forces was on a basis of consent. Even our Socialists here in Britain, which is probably the most democratic of European countries, would have a fit if it were suggested that the rank and file in the services should even be consulted as to who should be in command of them. This democratic outlook and temper, limited though it is by colour restrictions, is valuable. It is something to build upon; the situation is unlike what it would be if the very idea of democracy had to be propagated.

It is often said that the South Africans, or anyhow the Malanites, are Nazis. This is not really true; if it were, the situation would be hopeless. The basis of the assumption that the Nationalist Party is Nazi is that the racial theories are similar. There is little evidence to indicate that the people of this country hold different views from those held in South Africa. If two million people were taken at random and put in place of the present South African white population they would be little different in outlook, particularly after a few years' residence there. The fact is that we are not Nazi, nor they. We forget that the acceptance of the abolition of the Colour Bar is only a recent thing and that it only exists for the most part at governmental level. On how many doors does a negro have to knock in London to get a room? Anyone would have to knock at a good many to get a room in London to-day, but you can be sure that the negro would have to knock on ten times as many. We have no grounds for adopting an attitude of superiority to the South African; on the contrary, we should have sympathy with his situation. There is another thing that must not be lost sight of, South Africa's participation in the war. South Africa was a considerable distance from the seat of the trouble in Europe and had every excuse for adopting a neutral attitude. Their action shows that there is a considerable body of opinion that recognizes the common bond between South Africa, Britain, and other European communities and this means that the views expressed here if tendered by people who are considered to be wellwishers must have some influence. Fear accounts to a very considerable degree for the South African attitude on colour issues; they are outnumbered 4 to 1 and it is important that they should feel that they have friends even if those friends do not approve of all that they are up to. It is as a friend that our special opportunity in Britain lies.

The several non-white communities wield no direct political power. The possibilities of action for them seem to lie most hopefully in policies of passive resistance and non-co-operation. It may be that the technique of Gandhi may be effectual in the land where he first shaped his political ideas. It must be remembered however that the political atmosphere in South Africa for a successful pursuit of non-co-operation is very much less favourable than that in India against a government with more scruples. It is of the utmost importance that the position with regard to civil liberties does not further deteriorate.

The attitude of the white population has had the effect of drawing all the non-white races together, something of an achievement because not only can there be, and there has been, very consider-

able strife between the various non-white races, but within the races there has been also heaps of strife. On the mines at Johannesburg it has been the policy to segregate the various Bantu nationalities and not without good cause. A common hatred is a good unifier. The Indian used to be very prickly when he was lumped in with the other non-European sections of the population and disapprobation was mutual between the half-caste coloured and the Bantu peoples.

In the white community the trouble is there are not the numbers to force on the industrial revolution. The industrialists are few and the white workers comparatively few, and those few get high wage rates which divorces their interest from that of the non-white worker. It is not true however to say that they are entirely unsympathetic with the plight of the native, and an acceptance of a policy to maintain white wage rates would make them sympathetic with the idea of a great widening of industry and would do away with fear of their economic standards being undermined. The poor white, who is almost invariably a conservative because he fears the position where he may be forced down to the level of the native, might react differently if someone actually gave him something instead of telling him what a wonderful fellow he is to have a white skin. The Malanites do remarkably little else besides tell the poor white that he is a brother.

Besides the fact of a large rural community, there are too many white people too comfortable to want to see anything drastic done. The electoral system is weighted in favour of the rural communities which is a very bad thing where there is a big rural community. Power should always rest with the progressive elements and that means with the towns. Exception can be taken to the idea of the Communists who deny any form of political power to peasants and rural communities; they go too far but the principle is right of contriving to see that progressive elements are at the helm.

A word now as to how the Malanites see the question and their attitude to their critics. They quite definitely state that they do not believe in the equality of races, and, further, that no government other than that of Britain does believe in it.. The Nationalists say that the Union cannot be such a bad place for the Bantu as tens of thousands of them are immigrants seeking work in South Africa from countries as far away as Nyasaland. This statement cannot be blinked. It may say nothing for the policies of South African governments but it says a mighty lot about deficiencies in the policies pursued in the countries under the administration of Britain and other nations. The fact is that the slow tempo British development of territories, with the building of an occasional indus-

trial plant and the opening of a college for a few dozen people, is not good enough. What we are doing is to improve the quality of peasant living and to build up a small educated minority. If we are enormously successful at what we are up to we may produce something like a new Iraq after a few generations. Of course, the development of a really primitive community is a very difficult task. When we look upon our own industrialization of the nineteenth century in Britain we are apt to overlook that we were building upon centuries of earlier industrial experience and of culture. With an appreciation of these facts one is less critcal of the difficulties of mixed populations. At first sight, one is inclined to say that one should prevent mixed populations because of the problems presented, but it is probable that the benefits outweigh the evils. With regard to the immigration of labourers to the Union, one should note that the effect is to keep wages lower than they would otherwise be. Even with the immigrant labour there is the complaint in the Union that farmers cannot get the labour they require. This is a good thing, farmers will have to give proper wages and provide better conditions to attract servants. A shortage of labour may point the way to progress. The Nationalists also point to the good work they are doing in the native areas to educate the native to a better type of economy and animal husbandry. Village communities are being created where before the native dwellings were scattered all over the countryside; fencing and stock waters are being provided; the native is being educated to a market economy in place of keeping stock to live off. Contour ploughing has been introduced and other forms of soil conservation. These policies, though a product of the previous Smuts administration, are creditable to the present regime. The Nationalists point, too, to steps taken to start industrial communities within the Native Reserves. Although what has been done is small it is all to the good. In any satisfactory policy that could be pursued the industrialization of these areas consisting of some 30 million acres must form a part.

When wondering what can be done, what seems the most hopeful avenue of approach is to make the South African aware of the issues on a long-term view. Power rests with them for some time to come. Their education and organization make them masters of the situation for at least a matter of decades, but what are the long-term prospects for their retaining power? They occupy a part of a continent occupied by Bantu nations that are developing towards self-government, can a couple of million people maintain their position permanently against tens of millions? The world is increasingly accepting racial equality as an ideal, can a small community go against the current of opinion? The answer is that they can, for

a considerable time at least, but it does no good. It is a matter of evolution; you have either to go on or go out. If the present policy is pursued it must isolate South Africa. If it is wrong to say now that she is Nazi, it won't be in the future because repression will be increasingly necessary. To go forward is a terribly difficult decision for the white South African to take, but to remain where he is now is impossible. Men of vision are required who are not afraid of unpalatable truths. No people is less ready to adopt heroic measures than is that of South Africa to-day. I am reminded of the situation in this country and elsewhere in the years leading up to the second world war. Nothing was more obvious than that something should be done to stop the Nazis but the will was not there to do it. It is frequently the case that people have to be forced into a position where they have to do something. The South African people need a Dunkirk episode to force them to action. The fact is that when people eventually stop trying to evade the responsibilities that history has placed upon them they feel much happier, however desperate their situation may be. If a great programme was adopted and embarked on which would give the vision of justice for all races a wave of happiness would sweep across the face of the land. South Africa is a desperately insecure country and this applies to the white as well as the other communities.

It should be pointed out that notwithstanding anything I have said on the relationships between urban and rural communities in South Africa the industrialization process still moves, and in this lies the greatest hope. A *laissez-faire* atmosphere at any rate allows industry to be the most dynamic force in society. It must be pointed out that there are dangers in the abandonment of *laissez-faire* in favour of the more deterministic approach of the modern manner. The planning approach in a nation with racial problems such as those in South Africa might be used as a weapon against sections of the community. With its blindness the *laissez-faire* system allows for the raising of wages through competition. This has been offset in considerable measure by the vast pool of labour available both within and without the borders of the Union, but there are signs now that this pool is nearing exhaustion, and competition for labour is setting in. What is needed in the more advanced countries is a far more informed criticism of the administration of backward areas. The opinion of British governmental circles on native administration, as reflected in the fact that a different philosophy and programme is held, carries weight in governmental circles in South Africa because Britain has a wealth of experience in this field. Too much criticism emanates from

those who have no idea of the problems involved in multi-community states or in the industrialization of backward areas.

South Africa should be the leader of African nations south of the equator. No help that Britain can give to the African countries under her administration can put them in the position of advantage that the presence of two millions of people on a modern level of development affords. To fulfil this role she must become a truly African nation.

COMMUNICATION

by Lois Ann Hubbard

And statues without either windpipe or lungs
Often speak louder than men doe with tongues.

THE ICONOCLASTIC is now with the arts; it is no longer with ethics and religion; the ethical debate is in the market place and has an economic slant.

I cannot write from right to left. But I can humbly follow without apology that other Chinese custom of stating my conclusion first and then append my reasons.

The Chinese ancient wisdom confesses by this custom to rationalizing within the ambit of our reasoning. Reasoning after all cannot be abstracted as a pure isolate, so dogmatism becomes the one unforgivable heresy. Hence the urgent western need for semantic study to unwrap significance and bring virgin truth from out the well.

The Germans have a word "gestalt" to connote the complexity of existence, of any real being. In using this word they are extracting from something which is in constant flux and movement. To lose sight of the living relationships is to grow a crop of absurdities, logical notwithstanding, to make Sidney Keyes':

Mirrors and white perspectives of despair
Surround the seeker.

Patrick Geddes says that the philosopher is always the coordinator. That is a standard we can all try to follow. Coordination is by selection of the significant, the revealing, living and changing common. This is true synthesis.

In his sphere Cezanne applied this to painting. His dictum was "Peindre, ce n'est pas copier seulement l'objectif: c'est saisir una harmonie entre des rapports nombreux."

G.B.S. said that the Englishman finds it necessary to have the church within his community, and then he turns in the opposite

direction and traces his steps down to the pub. Shaw also provocatively opened his autobiography with "Rembrandt and Velazquez are my gods."

Similarly, we are more concerned with our artist iconoclasts than with religious controversy. The Englishman spends more and more of his time and money on books and music and study of the visual arts.

When the cistercians expelled icons and images and decoration and ornament, they attempted a deep division between the significant and the insignificant. They created a new austere beauty, a new architecture of essence and simplicity.

Contemporary artists are adventuring and experimenting since Cezanne with time and space, and we stand aghast. It is disturbing to see space wrenched apart and reassembled. But when Picasso reassembles different planes of vision on one canvas, different aspects of one woman so synthesised that a line is multi-dimensional, synoptic of several lines of vision, we take note. This is organization indeed, form and structure with a new meaning.

So too when time is reassembled or telescoped to alter the serial order of events, like a film cut, or reversed, or superimposed, or as Somerset Maugham does in the fragment from his *Note Book* which I think reads something like this:

"As I came into the room my aunt rose from her chair. I leaned on the mantel in the firelight and she came and put her arms round my neck saying: 'I wanted to tell you that I have been ill, and I am afraid I shall not last the winter through.' And indeed she looked frail enough to give that fear the edge of prophecy. She added: 'I fear for your uncle, that he will not survive the parting.' And then I knew that I was dreaming. For my aunt had been dead two years, and I remembered that my uncle had married again within the year."

That play with time is displayed by Somerset Maugham to take the reader into his confidence. But it is often half unconsciously and often wholly unconsciously perceived. Speaking of pattern, Martin Johnson says: "The imaginative life of the visionary is no idle relaxation. The artist must know with terrible intimacy the implication of his work. The laws connecting pattern with human significance . . . this is the legendary struggle of the carver of one single piece of jade."

Consider the use of time in the following small extract of which I am sorry to have to omit the name of the author, although for my part on re-reading it I think I would rather have been its author than have done anything else in the wide world: "The world of becoming is a hierarchy of occurring, recurring, and enduring. To

the mind's eye the shape of the endurances tend mostly to recur, but less so along the line of classification from recurrence to occurrence. And in the momentary temporal flux the ideas and ideals of the eye mind seem all powerful to create in a purely plastic world. But creative thought at this point is the point of vision of all the mind that is, that ever was, that heritage of creative thought that beams and sees like a star, a beaming seeing gossamer dandelion clock of infinite extension."

Speaking of the connection between pattern and the unconscious, Herbert Read says: "I would say myself that there is no real contradiction between art, conceived as design, and the unconscious. The unconscious does in fact reveal design. Not only is the dream when understood, a dramatic unity, but even in its plastic manifestations the unconscious possesses a principle of organization."

This too is the anthropologist Evans-Pritchard's conception of organic integration of a common body of beliefs and customs.

And since nothing is more congenial than the company of fine minds, let us add this from A. N. Whitehead: "There are many things in the world whose behaviour towards each other always exemplifies fixed rules—the laws of nature according to science. The laws are the outcome of the character of the behaving things: they are the communal customs. That character is the structure of life itself, and it is the informing and communicating principle throughout."

And if, as John Stuart Mill says, the structure of our thought is embodied in the institutions of our time, dare we on the conscious level suggest that ethical synthesis is now informing the growth of a host of new institutions under present urgent pressure? That ethical debate is now adding a new significance to buying and selling and distribution?

The Schuman Plan is in part a functional synthesis of a political and industrial problem. The Marshall Plan is a synthetic solution to a problem of over and under distribution of wealth. The "Twenty million more for the Colonies" under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act is that also. The very names of the current alphabetical agencies indicate their synthetic intention: E.C.A. European Currency Agreement, O.E.E.C. Organization for European Economic Co-operation, G.A.T.T. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Benelux. The world sits down to conference after conference at all levels to parcel out the raw materials and free the channels of distribution and neutralize the sting in nationalism. If it is worthy and well done the principle of design will deserve universality in due time, and bind the universal working day into a larger homogeny. The necessary significance is on the spon-

taneity, creativity, self-responsibility, of each smaller group within the synthesis. The tools for the forging of the instrument are within our power.

The little tree of the early Italian artists had its roots in the biblical tree of knowledge, in the symbolical Persian tree of life, and in the sacred peach tree in the Kun-lun paradise whose fruit according to Chinese tradition ripened once in three thousand years and bestowed immortality upon all who ate of it.

The relationship between the warmonger and our current political context is surely the same. In Patrick Geddes' Valley Section the hunter and the shepherd shared the slopes above the valley. The hunter lived by taking life, the shepherd by tending it. Hunters are short-lived, shepherds patriarchal. Kings, nobles and rulers have remained hunters to this day, but the shepherd had long days free from excessive toil in which to brood upon the hiving in the valley below. In this twilight of the warlike peace it might be useful to remember that both are intermixed with our other ancestors in our present conurbation populations, and in our own-self. They are not outside us, but aspects of ourselves.

No history shows this theme more clearly than China, where the dynasties and the way of life grew out of one another in what must seem a veritable eternity compared to the brief glory that was Greece. Of the utmost significance is the almost rhythmic civil war throughout that long Chinese history. Chiang Kai-shek's son-in-law made a point of this in his English writings.

Looking at English history, the symbol of King Charles' head becomes the uncodified constitutional tradition by which party government drops a minister to adjust itself to the common immediacy. Can the Russian purges perhaps be partly understood in this light?

Whether in spite of the civil wars, or because of them, the Chinese way of life flowed on, and its art flowed literally in the "continuous style" too. From the very earliest it seems sophisticated with "attained victories over instinct and circumstance, in security of fine habit." Laurence Binyon adds "how it loves the form of movement, flame, wave, cloud, or flying bird or dragon. Western decoration seems frozen by contrast. But this comes from the deepest intuitions of the race, from its very conception of the universe."

The Chinese have never apparently focused their attention so narrowly as we on their own species. They have never lost sight, according to Roger Fry, "of its relative position in the scheme of nature. As a result we are like to feel the inadequacy, and from our point of view, the relative insignificance of their figure imagery. The mere absence of that special human arrogance of the European

has allowed the Chinese to retain much of that peculiar intimacy with animal life which characterizes primitive man and persists in our own childhood. It is much the same with their treatment of plant forms. These are treated with a certain grave respect."

Sibelius is among the few artists of our time who have attained this detached view of the human race within the larger setting of nature.

But the Chinese gravity is never altogether untouched by humour. Their naïve fun diminutes the tragic spirit. A Michelangelo is almost unthinkable in their atmosphere, with his warring with his contemporaries and his best patron the Pope banished from his own chapel till completion.

In the twelfth century, Hangchou, the marvellous city described by Marco Polo, was the centre of a transformation of a tradition in Buddhist art. Laurence Binyon says it set aside the value put on rites and ceremonies "or even the sacred scriptures, as such; recognizing how easily the human spirit in emancipating itself from the obvious forms of idolatry, can become enslaved to subtler or less tangible forms of the same thing, it relied on interior discipline, on intuition, and on wordless communication of the truth. The placing of an object in relation to another object, or even to mere space: there is an access of significance which creates a passage from the world of fact to the world of idea." What is in the painter's mind goes out into his work and passes from that into the mind of the spectator. This is the significance of that iconoclastic Sung painting which re-created Chinese art in perhaps its most enduring form.

Paul Nash explains his identical aim thus:

"Snarers put out the eyes of birds to make them sing. Bullfinches, goldfinches, and larks. I found a stone upon the Downs like a blind bird. Choking with song it dared not fly but seemed to strain upwards always. I will make an ivory hand I have, fling the stone into the sky where it may sing until it dies and falls down into the furrow."

ETHICS, INCENTIVES AND PERSONAL INCOMES

by J. Henry Lloyd

MUCH contemporary discussion about "incentives" in industry is rather futile because it is superficial in its understanding of the class basis of our society and of the mainsprings of human action. It has, in the first place, ignored the fundamental moral and economic distinction between personal income derived from active socially necessary work of some kind and that which is derived from *mere* passive ownership of some means of production or distribution. The failure of the Government adequately to recognize and provide for the clash of principle and interest involved in this distinction has been responsible for some of the difficulties in wage negotiations in recent years. Despite heavy taxation, there are substantial unearned accumulations of wealth in the hands of individuals which present not only an anachronism in a political system professing democracy but a challenge to the moral stability of society. Spent as income, these accumulations increase our economic difficulties.

Putting on one side, however, this deeper aspect of the problem of personal income, there are big questions of ethical interest in the correlation of personal exertions and economic rewards between one worker and another, one occupation and another, and one industry and another. A century ago, perhaps even 50 years ago, it was commonly argued, and economists assumed, that wages were fixed by what a man was "worth," suggesting that there existed some kind of mathematical formula by which they could be calculated. In actual fact, the uncertainties of the market for goods and the absence of effective checks on profit-taking left wages largely at the arbitrary will of the employers. It is only the growth of the power of the trade unions which has imported some degree of stability and moral validity into the current conception of wages. We are very far, however, from any clear, much less generally agreed, definition of the "just wage." What the war has produced, and the post-war economic situation has developed, is a marked tendency towards less inequality of income. Not only has taxation done much to reduce the extremely large incomes of the wealthy, but the changes in wage levels and the continuance of full employment have diminished the gap between professional and manual worker incomes and have indeed gone far to overlap the actual ranges of such incomes.

Economic events suggest the urgency as well as the wisdom of

more active thinking about the ethical aspects of personal income and of social planning to implement the conclusions of such thinking, if we, as a nation, are to avoid the catastrophes of intensified sectional struggles for greater shares in available resources and a much diminished standard of living. Some of the factors in this situation, international relations and the influence of world trading conditions, profoundly important as they are, I cannot discuss in this article save to point to the obvious and inexorable truth that they set definite limits to the resources referred to and therefore to our standard of life.

I am here more particularly concerned with those aspects of the matter over which we have some direct control, the policies of our government and of our trade unions and professional associations and the profoundly important opinion-making influence of cinema, radio, press and the innumerable voluntary associations of men and women in a democratic society. In a broad sense, every period is a time of transition, but in some the scope and speed of change is much greater and it requires keen discernment to distinguish the nature and probable outcome of existing trends, so great is their complexity and so variable the rate at which they move. While this suggests the advisability of caution in judgment, sufficient data is available for the conclusion that Great Britain has entered upon an era of profound social change in which many established traditions and values of the last two centuries will be upset. Resistance to the general course of this revolution can only have the effect of confusing the temporary situation and perhaps adding to the social animosities which are an inevitable feature of such periods: it can have no ultimate effect and its possible value in temporarily benefiting anyone is very doubtful. Hence the value of any contribution the Ethical Movement can make to the better understanding and smooth solution of the problems thrown up in our day.

At the moment, two distinct cleavages of interest and opinion exist, neither of which has received any clear formulation or proper discussion on its merits. There is, first, the feeling among professional and middle-class workers that their incomes (and less tangibly their status and mode of life) have been unduly lowered as a result of recent social changes. The other is the general problem of the settlement of the wages of the manual workers, who because they are nearer subsistence level, feel even more acutely the rising cost of living, and whose income level is complicated by elaborate "differentials" of pay from industry to industry, occupation to occupation, or varying with degrees of skill and experience. If we are to attempt an ethical analysis of these problems, we must recognize some very simple human emotions (usually disguised in some

rationalization) which accompany the social data. The traditional association of income and status naturally brings chagrin and jealousy in its train when the loss of one class occurs while another class appears to have gained. The duke who is reduced to admitting the public to see his grounds and palatial house for a fee in order to add to his income, and the indignant middle-class housewife who has to make her own bed and cook her own meals are symptoms of this disturbance. They follow the tales of the miner who bought a grand piano for his parlour for show, and the municipal housing tenant who kept coals in her bath, which were possibly spread by a disgruntled industrialist, whose profiteering had been restricted, or a clerk or other middle-class worker ever conscious of his superiority to the manual worker and "the burden of the rates." We also must be realists in recognizing that the hitherto established relations of work and income have no sacred and final value. The pre-war assumption that a doctor was worth more than three or four miners or an engineer more than two dustmen or shop assistants was entirely arbitrary, owing its existence to an unjust social order, the hazards of commercialism, and a very limited application of democracy to our education and social life. All these assumptions are being questioned.

We are now in the stage when stark economic necessity compels us to recognize that miners, agricultural workers and those employed in our export trades are vital to our prosperity, if not to our continuance as a great industrial nation. Highly-paid industrial executives, civil service chiefs, university professors, bishops, and a host of other "very important persons" are no doubt necessary but they are useless without the ordinary worker, whose labour maintains them, as well as the community at large. Their physical needs and their essential claims on the common stock for their personal consumption do not materially differ from those of the ordinary man. But though national needs involve the restriction on the large incomes of the rich and the provision of more adequate incomes to attract and retain workers for its most urgent tasks, this does not solve the problem, as continued unrest and agitation demonstrate. There is not only the complex relation of the value of nominal income to the cost of living but the underlying sense of social maladjustment felt by classes whose noses have been put out of joint by the relative advance of other classes. Fundamentally, this attitude of looking over one's shoulder to see whether someone else is better off derives from a class-ridden society, whose tradition of possessions and income as a mark of status will take long to change. It can only be altered by a long process of moral education, but we need not disdain the acceleration and reinforcement

of such enlightenment by the present and probably continuing economic necessity for higher incomes for hitherto "depressed" classes. There is great need for franker and more frequent discussion of these issues. The Ethical Union would be doing a real social service by convening conferences of professional associations and trade unions to consider them. Professional workers, in particular, require the stimulus, and the facilities, to arrive at a better orientation in our changing society. The Trade Union Congress, despite some defects, does substantially represent the interests and views of the manual workers, but although there is a National Federation of Professional Workers this only covers a relatively small part of the field. So far as I know, there has never been a fully representative assembly of such people.

Facts and issues which should be considered at such conferences include:

(1) the vital difference being made in the entry to, and work in the professions by the democratization of education and the diminution and eventual abolition of patronage and privilege in advancement;

(2) the increasing sense of social function and public service rather than personal aggrandizement as the main purpose of work of all kinds; and

(3) the recognition that wide disparities of income are incompatible with a social-democratic community.

The implications in such an agenda, particularly in their technical form, would of course cover so great a ground and require such detailed consideration that one cannot pursue them here. It is equally impossible to gauge what response to such an invitation might be elicited, especially from the professional bodies. Nevertheless, it is so much in harmony with the trend within the movement to express Humanism in terms of its significance in contemporary social life that such an effort should be made. It would probably be advisable to work in two or three stages: separate conferences for the representatives of professional and manual workers respectively, and then a joint assembly if the previous conferences appeared to justify this hoped-for occasion.

Each of the issues which I have specified may perhaps be briefly outlined. Under the first, we must critically assess the relative personal satisfactions and hardships and the social usefulness of occupations, so that these criteria may be borne in mind in recruitment and remuneration. With an educational system which can obtain suitable candidates for any professional occupation from the whole population instead of the relatively small class which has hitherto had a monopoly of the more highly esteemed posts, there

may well be an embarrassing competition for such work and a shortage, already in fact experienced, for such essential but arduous work as coal mining. The free choice of career implicit in a democratic society and the provision for its economic needs may therefore involve an inversion of pre-war levels of personal income as between many classes. In so far as money income is a strong personal incentive, it may have to be balanced against other factors such as physical comfort and ambition or compensated for by shorter hours of work and longer holidays and new standards of social esteem in a more arduous job with less glamorous prospects. Having spent 45 years in the public service, mostly in a responsible administrative post, I have no doubt that many of my colleagues would share with me two thoughts: (a) that modest as we felt our salaries to be compared with those obtainable with our degree of knowledge and ability in private industry, we preferred not merely the security but the greater social usefulness of our work, and (b) that its status and interest would have led us to prefer it to the routine work of one of our subordinates at the same salary or even a slightly higher one. This is not a matter of moral superiority or of disdain for material rewards but of the zest and satisfaction that comes with a congenial task giving scope for self-expression.

The second issue brings us sharply face to face with the central problem of social democracy in industry, acute in the nationalized industries, but increasingly felt in privately owned industry as well, the development of a sense of social function and responsibility in *all* those employed, from managing director to junior apprentice. It is not only in questions of efficiency and productivity, but equally in questions of wage negotiation, that a satisfactory worker-community relation depends upon a greater degree of industrial democracy. Only to the extent to which all classes of workers develop the sense of "belonging" to a human organization and exercise a responsible share in the running of their business will the atmosphere be created in which questions of personal remuneration can be considered without sectional animosity and prejudice.

This naturally leads on to the broad consideration of personal income in a community moving towards the humanist and socialist conception of a democratic commonwealth. We do not always realize the extent to which the necessities of the last Great War and the progressive policies of the last five years have reduced the great fortunes of the rich and increased the incomes of the formerly very poor. The beginning has been made in the formulation of an income policy which may set limits to wealth and at the same time maintain a minimum to ensure a reasonable standard of subsistence and comfort for the poorest. Should we go further and

aim at equality, as an even higher moral standard? Personally attractive to me as this theme is, I pause here to leave it, "an open question."

A MOLECULAR APPROACH TO MORALS

by David S. Kahn

THE chemist analyzes a problem by assuming an atomic or molecular configuration by which one can deduce properties of measurable macroscopic events. Although interactions of matter can be most complex, it is often possible, as a simplifying assumption, to neglect these complications. Instead, one postulates a simple n-fold manifestation of a molecular event on the macroscopic scale. If the chemist is fortunate, conclusions derived by this type of extrapolation will conform proximately with what can be measured. Using converse logic, one may guess a molecular configuration from considerations of known molecular configurations in conjunction with macroscopic measurements. There is nothing very new about this. It is essentially what some early Greeks attempted and it is what Dalton, with added quantitative disciplines, did do. Because of the great complexity of the subject of ethics, any simplifying assumption could be drastic. However, we believe there is a great deal of data to effect a successful extrapolation from molecular configurations to morals.

There are many facts of biological nature to indicate that the nucleoprotein molecule is the building block of living organisms. Chemical analysis has shown the chromosomes of the nucleus of a cell to be aggregates of these nucleoprotein molecules. Thus, nucleoproteins are surely the synthetic instigators of cell reproduction; the bearers of genes which determine traits of reproduction and which sustain mutations. Because of this synthetic resourcefulness, we regard nucleoproteins as molecules which can synthesize replicas of themselves. There is no consensus as to what this replicating process is; what a gene is; or how a gene is mutated. Because of their importance, a great deal of data pertaining to proteins has been gathered. The eventual goal is to use these data to formulate adequate hypotheses to evaluate protein reactions.

As a point of candour, we must concede that a hypothesis of a scientific basis of morals will create a conceptual device in the image of science. It would emphasize the modes of scientific criteria which are rooted in the physiology of observation and mature judgment of men—acting as a team. For a shrewder appraisal of the scientific method shifts the emphasis from authorities and

inventors to the cumulative effectiveness of the factual integrity and dispassionate judgment of the men of science. In a real sense, there is an organic relationship among scientists. Every scientific hypothesis must be based on reproducible data; must be consistent with scientific criteria (i.e., scientific common sense); and must enable prediction of data. Thereby the scientific organization is efficiently designed to originate hypotheses and to reject erroneous and primitive conclusions. It is co-operative intelligence, which does move scientific mountains, that we believe to be essential to moral activity.

Perhaps it was Herbert Spencer who first suggested that men, organized in a political structure, interacted similarly as cells colonized to make up an animal organism. Such a parallel is facile though obviously not strictly true. Men are not cells and are not differentiated as cells are. But the construction of all protoplasmic machines very probably does develop according to a common set of principles of the requirements of life. Using a mechanical analogy, a code of morals is the blueprint by which living entities relate their functions to increase the survival potential of the host organism. Any statement of a code of morals, developed from this point of view, involves assumptions as to what are the basic building blocks of life. We have anticipated our argument somewhat in pointing out biological evidence suggesting that the nucleoprotein molecule is such a building block. But this proposal develops rigor from an examination of the rates of chemical reaction of various nucleoprotein molecules.

The fragile and perhaps incomprehensible complexity of even the simplest living entities has discouraged the hypothesis that life came from accidentally accumulated chemicals. A few men, as J. B. S. Haldane, have made so bold as to suggest that chemicals could accumulate so as to produce life. For lack of certain knowledge of the biosynthetic reactions by which proteins are built up and decomposed, there is yet merit in being conservative with respect to the theory of abiogenesis of life. But, significantly, contemporary chemical literature does evidence strongly that contraction of the protein molecule can be a precursor to many essential living reactions. For the energy required to activate the muscle molecule to contract is known (19,000 calories per mole). We regard as striking the correlation that the energy of activation of protein luminescence and of protein denaturation also is 19,000 calories per mole. Some preliminary evidence also indicates that a rate determining step of enzymic activation is the same (for the denaturation of albumin by a proteolytic enzyme). We cannot yet reject the possibility that ages ago there was synthesized a protein molecule

having contractile properties—enabling protein synthetic procedures . . which mounted the first rung of the ladder of evolution.

The latest phase of the biogenesis-abiogenesis dispute revolves around explaining the origins of viruses. Since the hypothesis of biogenesis worked successfully for animals and bacteria, many able investigators feel that we can expect a similar development for viruses. But in continental Europe and in Japan there are protagonists of the alternative conclusion that viruses occur *de novo*. In Germany, Doerr has advanced the hypothesis that the herpes virus results when certain human cells are *stimulated* to abnormal activity. In Japan, Yamafuji reports that chemical *stimulation* with hydroxylamine and hydrogen peroxide can induce virus diseases in silkworms and tobacco leaves. In cancer, too, which many are now beginning to regard as a virus sickness, the incidence of disease is correlated with *stimulation* by X-rays, burns, aniline dyes, arsenic, dilute acid or alkali injected subcutaneously, hormones, etc. In conjunction with this we believe that it is salient that mutations are similarly produced by *stimulation* by X-rays, ultra-violet rays, chemicals, etc. Those viruses whose chemical composition have been proven *were invariably nucleoprotein*. Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that nucleoproteins of the body cells can sustain mutations similarly as the nucleoproteins of the reproductive cells. This being so, a virus may often be a mutant nucleoprotein of the host organism.

The chemical nature of genes and the chemical changes involved in mutations are yet unresolved, rather obscure subjects. But a valuable clue to these problems may exist in some quantitative data by a Russian, Blagoveshenskii. He correlates rates of enzymic reactions with conventional aging, phylogenetic aging and tumor formation. To essay an explanation of the possible import of these data is a task of considerable technological complexity. Such an analysis is properly a problem in physical chemistry involving primarily the theory of rate processes. But the data of conventional aging very possibly is consistent with a conclusion that it results from a protein molecule becoming more disorganized in its spacial inter-relationships. Consequently, an aging enzymic protein is less apt to effect its characteristic reactions. Secondly, his data indicate that a virus results from a reorganization in space of a nucleoprotein so that its characteristic enzymic reaction occurs more frequently. This virus molecule is now an outlaw (on the molecular scale). It greedily cannibalizes, killing its neighbours for additional food. The host organism sickens from the waste products of this battle and from the destruction of tissue vital to its survival. Thirdly, paralleling the decreasing reaction rate with aging, Blagoveshenskii

finds a decreasing reaction rate for a given enzymic process as the enzyme becomes older on the evolutionary scale. Thus, we note that as animals become more complex in attaining added fitness to survive, the enzymes enable this better teamwork by yielding on the molecular scale part of their sovereignty. This is consistent with the recapitulation theory whereby the embryo ascends the evolutionary scale as it ages. From this point of view, we may regard an enzymic reaction as that of a given gene, but at a very much slower rate than its pristine precursor generated by the reproductive nucleoprotein.

These conclusions of reaction kinetics argue that a plausible basic unit of life is the nucleoprotein molecule. Its relevance to disease and evolution is consistent with such a proposal. One cannot help but be intrigued by the power of this idea as an analytical device. From this approach we may deduce that pristine nucleoproteins probably were cannibals of each other; were naked to their environment and were scavengers of chemicals randomly synthesized. But these nucleoproteins, sustaining mutations, occasionally did better their chances at survival. For example, they walled themselves in to help resist destruction by the elements. Subsequent mutations enabled colonization and division of function of these walled-in nucleoproteins. Co-operating thus, nucleoproteins built yet stronger peripheral walls and achieved surer modes of reducing alien organisms to food. They increasingly synthesized chemicals to meet their needs and ceased scavenging the leavings of lightning and the sun. But the principle of division of function also required that these nucleoproteins surrender the sovereign attribute of preying indiscriminately on their surroundings. Those nucleoproteins which were so predatory as to metabolize their cell walls and their neighbours enfeebled the host organism and perished for their "sins."

From the beginning, the host organism had to develop molecular policemen (antibodies) to protect the inter-relationships enabling its existence from the depredations of *de novo* virus life. This process would seem to be the conservative principle of life—an attempt to maintain the *status quo*. But, as we know, such a *status quo* gave way repeatedly to the evolution of the species due to mutations of the nucleoproteins of the reproductive cells. As a result of this evolutionary process, the nucleoprotein molecule became ever better serviced by an organism having increased savagery of attack; added synthetic resourcefulness; and a better wall against the environment. Clearly, these improvements also necessitated the establishment of additional and more ingenious molecular policemen. It is quite probable that some species, having a surfeit of

body armour, warring abilities, etc., became extinct because of an inability to restrain their lawless nucleoproteins from destroying, by virus activity, the orderly relationships of its organs.

Many observers, in describing crime, have seen fit to picture it as a disease. This literary device appears rather colourful but not very rigorous. After all, a criminal is obviously not a bacterium, protozoan, virus or any other representative of a parasitical phylum. It is important to the community that his rights as a human being be observed. But if the foregoing description of a possible source of virus infection is accurate, a theoretically significant mechanism can be formulated wherein crime (or any social disease) is rooted in physiological events paralleling those of some conventional virus disease. For the sake of analysis, we postulate a concept of a political organism carrying out on a macroscopic scale the living requirements of the genes of its constituent molecular units. Its institutions become refined extensions of the division of function characterizing the animal organism involved. Institutional centralization of authority has the obvious merit of enabling greater speed in development of power and greater concentration of power to deal with the impersonal elements and the competing predators. But even as division of function of an animal organism is disrupted by the enhanced virulence of a nucleoprotein turned virus, the balanced efficiency of the centralizations of a political organism is disrupted by the enhanced acquisitiveness of a man turned Machiavelli. It is quite probable that some types of political organisms—having a technology enabling a surfeit of national body armour, international warring abilities, etc.—become extinct because of an inability to restrain their Machiavellis from destroying, by virus-like activity, the orderly relationships of their institutions.

People dote on their heroes in politics as in sports and science. Here again, it is the man who carries the ball who gets the plaudits of the crowd. But our shrewder observers (as John Dewey) here too urge that we set a higher value on the import of co-ordinated efforts by the citizens of a political organism. However, we are well advised to avoid a Spencerian parallel between an animal organism and a political organism. Rather, both may be described as types of protoplasmic machines guided by nucleoproteins and purposed to exploit energy and material to enhance the survival potential of these nucleoproteins. Obviously, a political organism is not contiguous in a simple mechanical fashion as is an animal organism. Alternatively, the unit cohesive operation of a political organism is suggested to be an experience or conceptualization shared by the community. Thereby, the immediate physiological basis of a political organism becomes the aggregate of nucleoproteins of the

nervous tissue. A necessary corollary of this approach is that any private intelligence or undeveloped intelligence makes no contribution to the stability of a political organism. And certainly, attempts to censor the intelligence of the ages, as bookburning, weakens a political organism. A tyrant is a man who breaks down the cohesion of a political organism by censorship (so that much intelligence remains private intelligence); by repression, "educating" men to be increasingly servile (thus simplifying the problem of censorship); and by making the history of civilization an abject creature of his autobiography. The comparative strength of a democracy resides in its moral efficiency in policing the virus-like nucleoproteins of the nervous tissue which drive men to deny and to war against the power inherent in co-operative intelligence. The victories of the protagonists of such Machiavellian madness are stark tragedy. For men, in their group activities, have fashioned many tools. But co-operative intelligence is queen—mother of them all.

There is independent evidence of the importance of neural nucleoproteins and their spacial configurations. McCullough and Pfeiffer cite the clinical evidence that protein denaturants, as alcohol, cause loss of memory (Korsokow's psychosis). They also cite von Foerster's conclusion that, since some things are never forgotten, there must be a regenerative process to multiply "traces" before they fade. The consenses is that only nucleoproteins have the capacity for synthesis of such replicas of themselves. The "trace" of von Foerster can be alternatively described as a change in the spacial configuration of a neural nucleoprotein. This chemical event is quite kindred to that already set forth to explain the chemistry of a mutation or of the *de novo* synthesis of a virus.

The characteristics of cancer and its therapy lend credence to the *de novo* incidence of viruses and provide provocative parallels to the psychology of social disease. It has been found experimentally by Rous that the rate of growth of a cancerous tumour is less than that of a benign virus tumour. Too, since a cancer (virus) grows within a cell structure whereas more virulent viruses often destroy cell structure, a cancer is perhaps more indigenous to normal living processes. This decreased virulence of a cancer virus can entail a mechanism equivalent to that enabling the subtlety of the neural nucleoproteins of the more insidious political diseases. A decreased virulence of a cancer virus also suggests that those viruses presumed produced by X-radiation can often exceed the virulence of cancer. Such viruses would prey on normal nucleoproteins and then on the cancer virus. Thus, one would predict that X-radiation of tumour tissue would be more effective *in vivo* than *in vitro*. Confirming this expectation Goldfeder found that it required from 16 to 60

times more radiation to prevent growth of a tumour *in vitro*. A corollary expectation involves the reasonable assumption that the aggregation of a virus depends on the amount of food present. If there is merit in the thesis that viruses produced by X-radiation prey on cancer tissue, then X-radiation accompanied by a rich protein diet should produce more of these predators and be more effective in destroying the cancer. Elson and Lamerton have found that increasing the protein diet, in conjunction with X-radiation, helped markedly the therapy of cancer. This rather bald technology is intriguing in that it suggests a therapy for some social pathology, parallel to that for the subtle insidiousness of cancer.

Immunization involves establishing an antibody-antigen reaction. It is in no way misleading to suggest, as a homely parallel, that immunization is similar to training a police force to catch a specific type of criminal. In this dead serious game of molecular cops and robbers, the virus antigen is a molecular outlaw and the antibody is a molecular policeman. Chemists have established that the antibody is a certain type of protein molecule. In its reactions, the antibody has been shown not only to make chemical distinctions but also to be selective of the subtler types of spacial differentiation in molecules. But cancer is a disease to which effective immunization seems impossible of attainment. There are chemical and kinetic data to indicate that the cancer virus is so slightly changed spacially from the normal nucleoprotein as to make inadequate the rate of deactivation by antibodies. From this point of view, cancer therapy is an attempt to make the cancerous nucleoproteins sterically obvious so that they may be readily policed by the antibodies.

To make a scientific guess, let us re-examine this parallel. We note that a virus (having an atypical spacial configuration) is policed by antibodies. These antibodies have been shown to be specific to a fine gradation of spacial arrangement of an "outlaw" molecule. We have the expert opinion, based on experimental evidence, that changes in the spacial arrangements of neural nucleoproteins constitute the mechanical basis for a "trace." Let us next consider the problem of policing a "trace" which we believe to be in "error." The symmetry in these chemical events is consistent with the further proposal of a type of psychological antibody to police neural nucleoproteins having an unwanted "trace" or steric configuration. There is also the intriguing verbal consistency between the difficulty of policing a slightly virulent virus of cancer and the difficulty of policing a subtly immoral concept, apparently indigenous to a culture. Perhaps the purpose of psychoanalysis is to make a subtle error obvious. If so, such a procedure could parallel the radiation

therapy of cancer. For such psychotherapy could tag a virus-like neural nucleoprotein with an enhanced virulence making it sterically obvious to an assumed psychological antibody.

The hypotheses of virus-like neural nucleoproteins and of psychological antibodies await chemical corroborative evidence. But even if they prove not to be rigorous, they provide an interesting intellectual scaffolding to venture an analysis formulating a moral construction to advance the cause of peace. Citizens of all cultures tend to be complacent about their own Machiavelli's and acutely aware of those of another. Yet even as a man attempts to approach a moral God through proclaiming that he is a sinner, patriotic citizens of all cultures should attempt to approach a moral peace by showing more concern about their own organizational weaknesses. Forgoing the jungle-option of creating corpses of dissidents, men should deal directly with their "cancerous" neural nucleoproteins which cause in a political organism a Machiavelli syndrome. If men destroy the subtlety of their largely indigenous cultural mistakes, they may well develop the requisite psychological antibodies. Such psychological warfare, used constructively, becomes moral therapy.

Anthropological studies suggest that the art of moral behaviour has made great progress through the centuries. The techniques for making these advances are perhaps moot. But certainly these techniques are not distinguished by scientific disciplines. On the contrary, the process more strongly resembles the haphazard events of natural selection among mutant moral relationships embodied in their respective political contexts. Even to-day, we choose to establish moral values by a test of atom bombs and guided missiles. Perhaps the eventual elimination of war will involve adopting the scientific attitude towards moral problems. Such a conclusion is implicit in the hypothesis that moral power characteristically requires a teamwork (in a political context) of neural proteins paralleling that of the conventional scientific team.

There is a consensus among scientists that the brain is an analogy machine. From the bias of protein chemistry, one anticipates that the operation of the brain involves protoplasmic units which are first cousins to known types of nucleoproteins, antibodies, phagocytes, etc. Thereby, the brain is a "stage" on which the grim drama of evolution is enacted so that "good" nucleoprotein mutants (which may be alternatively referred to as genes or traces) survive and "bad" ones are inactivated by a mechanism similar to destroying viruses. Thus, this protoplasmic analogy machine (i.e., the brain) enables a substitution for the "tooth-and-claw" law of the jungle in which mutations must ensue and be selected.

Intelligent adjustment is superior to evolutionary adjustment in that it is quicker and it permits "errors" to be disposed of without hazarding the destruction of the species. Failing to make an intelligent adjustment, we resort to war. That is, we ignore our intellectual capacities and fall back on trial by "tooth and claw" as if for a classical type of mutant species. The development of a scientific basis of morals, therefore, waits in part on a successful investigation of the working of this protoplasmic analogy machine. If such could be achieved, it is hard to see how anything could have a higher priority in the establishment of peace among men. For in an understanding of intelligent behaviour, coupled with insight into the function of a political organism, we have a scientific alternative to war.

To various degrees, many moral analyses involve a verbal construction of polarities and of key word symbols. Experimentally, we can no more measure "good" or "bad" than we can "up" or "down," "regimentation" or "anarchy," etc. To the degree that our concept of the "happy-medium" is a result of the characteristics we attribute to the extremes, our analysis is non-scientific or verbal. Qualitatively, the hypothesis that moral activity involves (a type or degree of) division of function of a political organism to enhance survival potential is consistent with previous moral hypotheses of a Darwinian nature. But quantitative disciplines may be enhanced in invoking a protein hypothesis. A doctor does not define normal thyroid activity as a mean between hyperthyroidism and cretinism. Rather, he measures rates of thyroid secretion and correlates these with the survival potential of the host organism. Thereby he is able to define the range of thyroid secretion that is "normal"; to recognize and treat diseases associated with malfunction of the thyroid. Criteria for division of function of a political organism are rooted in measurable physiological events. Thereby we may determine moral activity explicitly from the data and deduce immoral activity implicitly as we do disease. To a degree, of course, men have always done this. But the added quantitative possibilities supporting a protein formulation of an ethic could help us avoid the deeper semantic pitfalls of word-magic and of polar analysis of ethical problems.

(This letter written by Proudhon to Marx explains the hatred and contempt with which Marx afterwards treated Proudhon. He had just been expelled from Paris and was trying to find Socialists with whom to correspond in order to keep in touch with events in France. He had written to ask Proudhon to act as a correspondent for this purpose.[1]

Lyon, May 17, 1846.

My Dear Mr. Marx,

I gladly consent to become one of the connexions in your correspondence, of which the aim and organization should be very useful, it seems to me. However, I do not promise to write to you much nor often; my various occupations, coupled with a natural indolence, forbid me these letter-writing efforts. I shall also take the liberty of making some reservations which have been suggested to me by several passages in your letter.

First, in regard to organization and realization, although my ideas are at the moment in suspense, at least as to the principles, I think it is my duty, that it is the duty of every Socialist, to preserve for some time yet the critical or sceptical outlook; in a word, I publicly profess an almost absolute economic anti-dogmatism.

Let us by all means seek together the laws of society, the mode of realization of these laws, the steps by which we arrive at their discovery; but, for God's sake, after having demolished all the *a priori* dogmatisms, don't let us dream of indoctrinating the people in our turn; don't let us fall into the contradiction of your great compatriot Martin Luther, who, after having overthrown catholic theology, set to work at once, fortified with excommunications and anathemas, to found a protestant theology. For three centuries, Germany has been engaged only in destroying the plastering over done by Mr. Luther; don't let us cut out for the human race a new task by other attempts to paper over the cracks. I applaud with all my heart your idea of bringing out all opinions into the light of day; let us join in good and loyal controversy, let us give the world the example of a wise and far-sighted tolerance, but, because we are at the head of a movement, don't let us make ourselves the leaders of a new intolerance, don't let us pose as apostles of a new religion, even if this religion be the religion of logic, the religion of reason. Let us welcome, let us encourage all protests; let us brand all exclusions, all mysticisms; don't let us ever regard a question as exhausted, and when we have used up all our arguments, let us begin again if necessary, with eloquence and with irony. On this

condition, I shall enter into association with you with pleasure, otherwise, no!

I want also to say something on this phrase in your letter: "at the moment for action." Perhaps you still hold the opinion that no reform is at present possible without direct action, without what used to be called a revolution, and which is quite frankly only an insurrection. This opinion, which I understand, which I do not exclude, which I would gladly discuss, since for a long time I shared it myself, I will admit to you my latest studies have made me turn away from completely. I don't believe we need that in order to succeed; and therefore we ought not to propose *revolutionary* action as the means of social reform, because this pretended means would be merely an appeal to force, to arbitrary strength, in short a contradiction. Therefore I set myself this problem: *how to bring back into society, by an economic association, the wealth which has gone out of society by another economic association.* In other terms, how to turn the theory of property in Political Economy against property, in a way that will bring about what you German Socialists call community, and which I shall be content for the moment to call *liberty, equality.* Now, I believe that I know how to solve this problem in not too long a time: I therefore prefer to burn property over a slow fire, rather than give it a new strength by making a Saint Bartholomew of the proprietors.

My next work, which is at the moment half set up in type, will tell you more about this.

That's where I am then for the moment, my dear philosopher; except that I may be deceived, and there may be room for your correction, to which I should submit with a good grace, waiting for my turn to come. I ought to tell you by the way that these seem to me to be also the sentiments of the working class in France; our proletarians have such a thirst for knowledge that one would meet with a very bad reception from them if one had only blood to offer them to drink. In short, it would be, in my opinion, bad politics for us to speak as exterminators; strong measures will come easily enough: for that the people have no need of any exhortation.

All good wishes to your friends Messrs. Engels and Gigot.

(P.-J. Proudhon, *Correspondance Générale,* II, p. 198).

FURTHER RELECTIONS ON FREEDOM OF THOUGHT

THE bewildering plurality of standpoints and contexts confuses the issue until we go back to first principles, and first principles in this case are drawn from historical experience. In England, the appeal against absolute government was to the restraint of custom (and, more vaguely, of natural law) enforced by the sanction of rebellion. On the other hand, the claim to absolute power founds itself upon the justification of an absolute purpose, whether it is the "rule of the saints" in 17th century England, or the rule of the party hierarchy in contemporary Russia, or the rule of the philosophers in Plato's Republic. The liberal ideal of the restraint of power (perhaps a mere knave-proof and fool-proof constitution) seems negative defeatism or weak optimism in comparison with the positive and daring bid of the absolutists to mould man in the image of some sacred ideal by a rigorous discipline, without which he is wretched. Nevertheless, with the development in the 19th century of methods of science and rational investigation and of methods of representative government and democratic association, the idea of seeking truth and justice in common by public and objective procedures offered an ideal as absolute as that of philosophers or theologians, to be attained by a rigorous discipline that was not servitude but rational freedom and which was not only less open to reasonable dissent but was actually itself a test of good faith and the rational qualification for authority. By these means both interests and opinions could be modified and brought nearer to a common measure, not by the dubious and depressing arrangements of expediency and compromise but by raising them to an objective standard.

This historical introduction of freedom of thought as a universal and necessary social ideal, with its operational definition in terms of public procedures, is the one permanent social foundation for all legitimate building. If in pursuing the methods of science and of democracy both thought and interests have become highly organized and closely specialized, those are the new conditions and the new problems for freedom. Although these forms of organization are forms of social order and control, they are compatible with cultural and moral disintegration, since specialization and segregation produce it, and since the methods of science and of democracy do not of themselves solve ultimate problems of truth and value, and leave a margin with ample room for widely divergent views, in which absolutists may become dominant. (Perhaps there was never more need for the well-equipped detached intellectual

to work in this margin, and never less social and educational provision for him.) The scale of organization, the rate of change, the range of every social problem demand strong and competent government and overriding common social purpose, and this encourages the absolutist, whatever his complexion, to hope that in an emergency the easier way of drastic simplification can be made the preferred alternative. Freedom of thought, like soil conservation, is a long-term policy, a faith in historical man, an imaginative concern for human destiny. Probably, more immediate satisfactions are to be gained by sacrificing it, but the quick-returns permanently impoverish the cultural soil.

Social progress is no longer possible by *laisser-faire;* it is a difficult possibility which depends on our capacity for rational control, and rational control, as Ruth Benedict has pointed out, is most endangered by those deep assumptions and dominant values with which a society is most sensitively identified and of which it is quick to resent and repel criticism. Such rational control is not merely nor mainly government control; it is rather a social purpose to which government as one particular social function is responsive. Such a social purpose is at the present time neither totally unformed, unmeaning nor unchallenged; at this growing point of society, it is freedom of thought that is the sap.

Although the case for freedom of thought rests basically on its permanent social utility, those who demand it for themselves are the ones who know how to interpret and share and how to promote their own experience and who delight to participate in the experience of others, with no nonsense about authority. If human life has to be infinitely less than this because the philistine rules there will be no good reason why it had to be so, to console the losers.

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THE JOURNAL OF
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A Popular-Scientific Journal for the Sexual Enlightenment of Adults

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